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List	of	Defined	Terms	
	
"Advisers"	means	Clifford	Chance	LLP	and	AECOM.		
	
"Annex"	means	any	annex	to	the	Application.	
	
“APHA”	means	Animal	and	Plant	Health	Agency	
	
"Application"	means	 the	 application	 by	 the	 Lynx	 Trust	 [to	 SNH]	 for	 a	 licence	 pursuant	 to	
section	16	of	the	WCA	to	release	Lynx	into	the	UK	on	a	trial	basis.		
	
"Application Document" means the text of the application only and does not include the 
annexes to the application.  
“DRA”means	disease	risk	assessment	
	
“Infections”	means	disease	causing	infectious	agents	
	
"IUCN	 Guidelines"	 means	 the	 Guidelines	 for	 reintroductions	 and	 Other	 Conservation	
Translocations	(2013),	available	online	at	www.iuchsscrsg.org.	
	
“IUCN	 Guidelines	 for	 DRA”	 means	 The	 IUCN/OIE	 Guidelines	 for	 Wildlife	 Disease	 Risk	
Assessment	(2014)	available	online	at		
	
"Key Themes" means the key themes which arise as a result of the Consultations cumulatively 
as set out in section [] of the National Public Survey, section [] of the National Consultation 
Report and section [] of the Local Consultation Report.  
"Licence"	means	any	licence	granted	as	a	result	of	the	Application.	
	
"Lynx"	means	Eurasian	lynx.		
	
"Lynx	Trust"	means	the	Lynx	UK	Trust	Community	Interest	Company	with	company	number	
09386570.	
	
"Mitigation"	 means	 the	 measures	 taken	 to	 minimize	 the	 risk	 of	 Infections	 	 and	Welfare	
Hazards	in	the	Lynx	and	the	resident	wildlife,	pets,	livestock	and	human	populations	in	the	
release	environment.		
	
"NE" means Natural England.  
"PALC" means the pre-application local stakeholder and community consultation process as 
set out in further detail at section [] of the Local Consultation Report. 
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"Partners"	means	[the	University	of	Cumbria,	the	Rewilding	Foundation,	the	White	Dog	Fund,	
[insert	as	we	progress]].	
	
"Project"	means	[●]
5
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"Project Plan" means [●]. 
"Release Pen" means []. 
"SNH"	means	Scottish	Natural	Heritage.	
	
"SNH Code" Translocations & Best Practice Guidelines for Conservation Translocations in 
Scotland means the Scottish Code for Conservation.  
"Study	Area"	means	the	Kielder	Study	Area	and	the	Eskdalemuir	Study	Area.	
	
"Swedish	Partners"	means	[●].	
	
"Team"	means	the	Lynx	Trust,	the	Advisers	and	the	Partners.		
	
"Trial"	means	the	proposed	trial	release	of	Lynx	for	a	period	of	[five]	years	permitted	if	under	
a	Licence	granted	pursuant	to	the	Application.	
	
"Trial	Animal"	means	each	of	the	[six	to	10]	individual	Eurasian	lynx	proposed	to	be	released	
during	the	Trial	and	"Trial	Animals"	shall	be	the	collective	term	for	them.		
	
"UK"	means	the	United	Kingdom.		
	
"WCA"	means	the	Wildlife	and	Countryside	Act	1981.		
	
“Welfare	Hazards”	means	non-infectious	agents	that	can	cause	disease	with	negative	impacts	
on	the	welfare	of	the	Trial	Animals	
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1.	Introduction
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1.1	The	Lynx	UK	Trust	CIC	
	
The	Lynx	Trust	is	a	Community	Interest	Company	(CIC)	currently	aiming	to	secure	a	Licence	
(“Licence)	to	conduct	a	scientific	trial	reintroduction	(population	restoration)	of	Lynx	(“Lynx”)	
to	the	Study	Area	(“Study	Area”),	which	covers	land	in	Northumberland,	the	Scottish	Borders,	
Cumbria	and	Dumfries	and	Galloway	on	a	time	limited	basis.		
	
The	 Lynx	 Trust	 (“Lynx	 Trust”)	 has	 put	 together	 a	multidisciplinary	 team	 (consisting	 of	 its	
Directors,	 volunteers,	 Advisers	 (“Advisers”)	 and	 Partners	 (“Partners”))	 which	 comprises	
academic	 ecologists,	 ecological	 consultants,	 veterinarians,	 public	 consultation	 experts,	
economic	consultants,	socio-economic	consultants,	forestry	specialists,	public	policy	experts,	
PR	experts,	media	advisers	and	lawyers.	All	team	members	are	highly	qualified	experts	in	their	
fields	 and,	 as	 such,	 the	 Trust	 believes	 that	 it	 is	 perfectly	 placed	 to	 make	 an	 Application	
(“Application”)	for	a	Licence	to	trial	the	reintroduction	of	Lynx	to	England	under	Section	16	of	
the	Wildlife	and	Countryside	Act	1981	(“WCA”).			
7
	
	
1.2	The	Proposed	Project	
	
During	the	Trial	the	Team	(“Team”)	would	observe,	measure	and	analyse	the	effects	of	Lynx	
on	various	aspects	of	the	UK's	natural,	social	and	economic	environments.	The	ultimate	goal	
of	the	Trial	(“Trial”)	is	to	enable	[NE/UK	Gov/SNH/Scot	Gov]	to	make	a	final	decision	as	to	the	
desirability	of	reintroducing	Lynx	to	the	wild	in	the	UK	on	a	permanent	basis.	If	such	a	decision	
is	taken,	the	Trial	Animals	(“Trial	Animals)	and	any	of	their	offspring	would	remain	in	the	wild,	
acting	as	the	founding	population	for	later	generations	of	British	Lynx.	
	
The	Project	(“Project”)	includes	all	preparation	required	for	the	Trial	and	any	period	after	the	
Trial	 during	 which	 [NE/UK	 Gov/SNH/Scot	 Gov]	 has	 not	 made	 a	 final	 decision	 on	 Lynx	
reintroduction.	The	Project	proposal	and	Project	Plan	(“Project	Plan”)	 	 is	set	out	 in	further	
detail	at	section	[●]	[of	the	Application	Document].				
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This	is	Annex	8.9	of	the	Application.	The	Application	is	comprised	of	the	Application	
Document	(“Application	Document”)	and	[fourteen]	supplementary	Annexes	(“Annexes”)	,	
which	have	been	drafted	in	accordance	with	the	IUCN	Guidelines	and	the	Scottish	Code,	for	
submission	to	[NE	/	SNH].		Where	relevant	and	appropriate,	each	Annex	takes	a	uniform	
approach	to	addressing	legislation,	policy	and	guidelines,	to	presenting	and	assessing	risks	
and	to	presenting	and	addressing	the	Key	Themes	of	the	Consultations.		
	
1.3	Disease	Risk	Assessment	
	
An	important	element	of	the	wider	Application	 is	a	Diseaese	Risk	Assessment	(“DRA”)	
9
	 to	
inform	the	licensing	authorities	and	the	Team	of	the	likelihood	of	disease	associated	with	the	
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Trial.	 	 Translocation	 affects	 host-pathogen	 communities	 in	 the	 donor	 and	 release	
environments.	The	primary	aim	of	the	DRA		is	to	proactively	minimize	the	likelihood	of	disease	
in	 the	 Trial	 Animals,	 other	wildlife,	 domesticated	 species	 and	 humans,	 by	 identifying	 and	
assessing	 the	 likelihood	of	disease	as	a	consequence	of	 the	Trial	and	recommending	cost-
effective	disease	Mitigation	(“Mitigation”).			
	
This	assessment	was	completed	by	a	team	of	veterinary	surgeons	with	extensive	experience	
of	the	diagnosis,	treatment	and	monitoring	of	infectious	and	non-infectious	wildlife	diseases.	
Additional	information	was	sourced	from	the	scientific	literature	using	the	academic	search	
engines	Web	of	Science	and	Google	Scholar.	Expert	opinion	was	sought	from	an	international	
network	of	 veterinary	pathologists,	 zoo	 veterinarians,	 ecologists	 and	epidemiologists	with	
experience	of	disease	monitoring	and	management	in	Lynx	[or	related	species	such	as	Canada	
lynx	[Lynx	Canadensis]]	and	their	prey	species.	
	
	[Risk	Assessment	Common	Text	Placeholder]
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1.4		IUCN	Guidelines	for	Wildlife	Disease	Risk	Analysis
11
	
	
[The	IUCN/OIE	Guidelines	for	Wildlife	Disease	Risk	Assessment	[“IUCN	Guidelines	for	DRA”]	
was	compiled	by?	the	IUCN	Species	Survival	Commission’s	Wildlife	Health	Specialist	Group,	
working	in	concert	with	the	Conservation	Breeding	Specialist	Group,	Reintroduction	Specialist	
Group	and	Invasive	Species	Specialist	Group	(4).		
	
The	IUCN	(2014)	recommend	that	disease	risk	assessments	should	be	conducted	prior	to	the	
translocation	 of	 species	 from	 a	 donor	 to	 a	 destination	 environment(4).	 Historically,	 DRA	
frameworks	were	applied	ad?hoc	to	situations	involving	wildlife,	often	without	a	consistent	
approach.	 Therefore,	 the	 IUCN	 Guidelines	 for	 DRA
12
	 were	 developed	 to	 provide	 a	
standardized,	evidence	based	framework	to	assess	the	disease	risks	associated	with	wildlife	
management	and	interventions(4).		
	
The	main	components	of	the	assessment	include	the	identification	of	hazards,	the	assessment	
of	 risks	 associated	with	 the	hazards,	 the	management	 of	 risks	 and	 the	 communication	of	
outcomes(4).	 The	 communication	 of	 risk	 to	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 stakeholders	 (e.g.	 statutory	
authorities,	 scientists,	 livestock	 farmers,	 conservation	 NGOs)	 will	 enable	 them	 to	 make	
informed	decisions	 regarding	 the	proposed	 reintroduction	 and	 implementation	of	 disease	
monitoring	and	Mitigation	strategies.	
	
This	DRA	regarding	the	Trial	is	based	on	the	standardized	framework	described	in	the	IUCN	
Guidelines	for	DRA	(4)]].
13
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Figure	1.	Steps	in	the	DRA	(4).	
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2.	Methodology
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[Quantitative	 disease	 risk	 assessments	 for	 the	 translocation	 of	 wild	 animals	 are	 often	
constrained	 by	 insufficient	 data	 relating	 to	 the	 prevalence,	 distribution,	 transmission	 and	
pathogenicity	 of	 aetiological	 agents	 within	 the	 population.	 This	 DRA	 uses	 a	 structured	
qualitative	approach	to	account	for	the	lack	of	precise	quantitative	data	and	to	incorporate	
expert	scientific	opinion	as	well	as	information	from	the	published	literature.	In	qualitative	
risk	assessments	 the	 likelihood	of	 the	outcome,	or	 the	magnitude	of	 the	consequences,	 is	
expressed	in	pre-defined	terms	such	as	‘high’,	‘medium’	or	‘low’.	
	
The	 authors	 used	 the	 method	 described	 by	 Sainsbury	 and	 Vaughan-Higgins	 (5)	 which	 is	
aligned	with	 the	 IUCN	Guidelines	 for	DRA.	 Infectious	and	non-infectious	causes	of	disease	
were	considered	to	be	a	hazard	if	they	had	crossed	an	ecological	or	geographic	barrier	and	
were	novel	to	the	host.	We	defined	a	geographic	barrier	as	a	natural	or	man-made	formation	
or	 body	 of	 water	 that	 constrains	 the	 physical	 movement	 of	 pathogens	 or	 their	 host.	 An	
ecological	 barrier	 may	 not	 be	 separated	 geographically	 in	 space	 but	 constitutes	 an	
unfavorable	habitat	for	a	pathogen	or	its	host	as	a	result	of	competition	or	the	lack	of	essential	
resources.		
	
The	distinction	between	a	translocation	pathway	with	or	without	ecological	and	geographic	
barriers	 is	 paramount,	 because	 barriers	 increase	 the	 likelihood	 of	 exposure	 to	 novel	
pathogens	at	the	release	site.	By	contrast,	translocations	between	contiguous	habitats	in	the	
absence	of	barriers	reduces	the	likelihood	of	exposure	to	novel	pathogens	and	the	overall	risk	
of	disease.	
	
With	 regard	 to	 the	 Trial,	 substantial	 geographic	 barriers	 exist	 between	 the	 donor	 and	
destination	sites.	Great	Britain	has	been	isolated	by	sea	from	Sweden	since	the	land	bridge	
that	connected	the	UK	to	continental	Europe	was	inundated	around	6500BC	(6).	The	North	
Sea	constitutes	a	geographic	barrier	of	850kms	between	the	east	coast	of	Great	Britain	and	
the	West	coast	of	Sweden.	Given	the	extent	to	which	the	donor	and	release	countries	have	
been	 isolated	 in	 time	 and	 space,	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 pathogens	 carried	 by	 the	 donor	 Lynx	
population	could	constitute	a	novel	disease	risk	to	native	wildlife,	livestock,	pets	and	humans	
at	the	release	site.	Furthermore,	pathogens	at	the	release	site	could	also	pose	a	threat	to	
immunologically	naïve	donor	Lynx.		
	
Diseases	that	occurred	at	both	donor	and	release	environments	were	excluded	from	the	DRA	
unless	 they	 occurred	 as	 novel	 subtypes,	 were	 notifiable	 to	 the	 local	 authority	 in	 the	
destination	environment	or	constituted	a	significant	population	and/or	zoonotic	risk.	Risk	was	
defined	 as	 the	 probability	 of	 a	 hazardous	 occurrence	 and	 the	 likely	 magnitude	 of	 the	
consequences	of	a	deleterious	event	to	animal	or	human	health.		
	
The	risk	assessment	process	considered	potential	disease	risk	in	translocated	Lynx	and	their	
progeny,	and	disease	risk	in	other	species	of	wildlife,	domesticated	livestock	and	humans	at	
the	release	site.	We	compiled	an	exhaustive	list	of	infectious	hazards	[“Infections’]and	non	
infectious	hazards	[“Welfare	Hazards’]	and	considered	disease	occurrence	at	every	part	of	the	
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translocation	pathway	including	the	donor	and	release	environments	and	the	route	of	travel.	
The	risk	associated	with	commensal	organisms	was	also	evaluated	given	that	translocation	
related	 stress	 could	 result	 in	 host-immunodeficiency	 and	 disease.	 Infectious	 and	 non-
infectious	 disease	 agents	 were	 described	 according	 to	 six	 hazard	 categories;	 source,	
destination,	carrier,	transport,	zoonotic,	population	(Table	3.).	
	
The	assessment	of	disease	risk	incorporates	the	likelihood	of	disease	occurring	in	the	species	
of	concern	(Lynx,	domesticated	livestock,	pets,	wildlife	and	humans)	and	the	likelihood	and	
severity	of	 consequences	of	disease.	 The	overall	 risk	estimation	 relating	 to	 Infections	and	
Welfare	Hazards	combines	the	likelihood	of	disease	spread	and	establishment	at	the	release	
site	with	the	probable	biological,	environmental	and	economic	consequences	of	the	disease.	
The	level	of	risk	is	categorized	as	negligible,	very	low,	low,	medium	or	high	on	the	basis	of	
subjective,	logical,	referenced	discussion.		
	
Mitigation	 recommendations	 will	 be	 described	 for	 each	 hazard	 unless	 the	 overall	 risk	
estimation	is	evaluated	as	negligible.	Mitigation	measures	against	the	release	and	spread	of	
disease	might	 include	therapeutic	treatments,	vaccinations	and	routine	monitoring	of	Trial	
Animals.]		
	
	
3.	Demographic	Parameters	of	Founder	Population	
	
[The	Trial	Animals	will	consist	of	approximately	[6]	mature,	adult	animals	sourced	from	robust	
populations	in	Sweden.	The	translocation	of	mature	adults	rather	than	juvenile	or	yearling	
Lynx,	ensures	the	selection	of	proficient	hunters	that	can	exploit	the	available	prey	base	in	
the	Study	Area	with	an	enhanced	chance	of	survival.		
	
Lynx	densities	are	typically	1-3	adults	per	100	km2	across	Europe,	although	higher	densities	
of	up	to	5/100	km2	have	been	reported	from	Eastern	Europe	and	parts	of	Russia	(7).	However,	
the	natural	population	density	of	Lynx	varies	according	to	prey	abundance	and	is	also	limited	
by	the	territoriality	of	individuals.		
	
A	typical	male	home	range	will	overlap	with	that	of	two	or	three	females.	Therefore,	the	ratio	
of	females	to	males	in	the	founder	population	will	be	2:1	to	reflect	the	sex	ratio	in	a	typical	
home	 range.	 The	 release	 of	 single	 sex	 individuals	 would	 result	 in	 an	 increased	 rate	 and	
distance	 of	 dispersal	 as	 animals	 search	 for	 breeding	 opportunities.	 Increased	 levels	 of	
dispersal	 could	 compromise	 the	 ability	 to	 monitor	 the	 Trial	 Animals	 and	 increase	 the	
anthropogenic	risks.		
	
All	Trial	Animals	will	receive	comprehensive	health	checks	to	determine	their	weight	and	rule	
out	symptoms	of	Infections	and	Welfare	Hazards.]
15
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4.	Translocation	Pathway	
	
4.1	Donor	and	release	sites
16
	
	
Discussions	with	European	advisers	and	senior	members	of	 the	 IUCN	Cat	Specialist	Group	
have	identified	Lynx	populations	in	the	Baltics,	Romania,	Slovakia,	and	Russia.	However,	The	
Team	have	decided	to	source	founder	Lynx	from	Sweden	on	the	basis	of	reduced	disease	risks,	
robust	 populations	 and	 the	 availability	 of	 a	 surplus	 hunting	 quota	 (8).	 If	 the	 founder	
population	was	sourced	from	a	country	such	as	Romania	where	rabies	is	endemic,	the	Lynx	
would	be	held	in	a	licensed	quarantine	facility	for	a	statutory	minimum	period	of	four	months	
as	stipulated	by	the	Animal	and	Plant	Heath	Agency	(“APHA”).	As	Sweden	is	designated	free	
of	rabies,	the	health	of	the	Trial	Animals	will	not	be	compromised	by	the	stress	associated	
with	a	prolonged	period	of	captivity.	The	Swedish	part	of	the	Nordic	Lynx	population	is	large	
and	increasing,	as	Lynx	are	expanding	southwards	and	have	colonized	the	southern	third	of	
the	 country	 (8).	 The	most	 recent	 census	 between	 2009	 and	 2011	 estimated	 the	 national	
population	to	be	between	1400-1900	individuals	(8).		
	
The	 Team	 is	 currently	 in	 discussions	 with	 a	 number	 of	 potential	 partner	 organizations	
including	 the	 Swedish	National	 Veterinary	 Institute	 (SVA)	 and	 the	 Swedish	 Environmental	
Protection	Agency	(EPA).	These	conversations	will	build	reliable	partnerships,	ensuring	proper	
procedures	and	safeguards	are	observed	in	the	identification	of	potential	source	populations.	
The	 veterinary	 team	 will	 work	 closely	 with	 regional	 scientific	 experts	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	
removal	of	donor	Lynx	does	not	compromise	the	ecological	and	genetic	integrity	of	the	source	
population.	
	
The	Team	has	considered	several	locations	as	potential	release	sites	in	the	UK	but	has	selected	
Kielder	Forest	in	Northumberland	(Figure	2.)	for	the	five-year	reintroduction	trial	(9).	
	
Table	1.	Relative	benefits	of	Kielder	Forest	as	a	release	site	for	the	Trial	(9).	
	
Relative	advantages	of	Kielder	Forest	as	a	release	area	
Greater	extent	of	woodland	cover		
	
Lower	degree	of	woodland	fragmentation	
	
Less	farm	land	within	site	boundary	
	
Lower	density	of	roads	per	km
2	
	
Lower	number	of	UK	protected	species	within	site	boundary	
	
Greater	scope	for	beneficial	impacts	to	the	local	economy	
	
Fewer	potential	barriers	(rivers,	railways,	roads)	
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For	any	release	site	to	be	considered	appropriate	for	the	Trial,	the	Team	will	demonstrate	
that	the	site	is	an	appropriate	habitat;	meets	all	abiotic	and	biotic	needs	of	the	Lynx;	is	large	
enough	to	meet	required	conservation	benefits;	has	connectivity	to	prevent	fragmentation;	
is	isolated	from	suboptimal	habitat	areas;	meets	all	requirements	for	a	release	with	minimal	
stress;	enables	the	released	Lynx	to	quickly	exploit	the	area;	and	is	suitable	for	media	and	
public	awareness	needs	(Table	1.).	]	
	
	
	
Figure	2.	Corine	 land	cover	map	 indicating	red	boundary	of	proposed	Lynx	release	area	 in	
Kielder	Forest	(9).	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure 4. Kielder Forest site boundary with Corine 2012 land cover map 
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4.2	Capture
17
	
	
The	 Team	 plans	 to	 draw	 on	 the	 expertise	 of	 professor	 Henrik	 Andren	 from	 the	 Swedish	
University	 of	 Agricultural	 sciences	 and	 others,	 to	 adopt	 best-practice	 procedures	 for	 the	
capture	of	Lynx.		
	
Kolbe	et	al.,	(10)	compared	the	incidence	of	capture	related	injuries	in	a	population	(N=63)	of	
Lynx		near	Seely	Lake	in	Montana	using	snares,	foot	hold	traps	and	box	traps.	The	authors	
observed	no	injuries	in	box	trapped	Lynx	but	the	injury	rate	for	Lynx	caught	in	foot	hold	traps	
was	43%	and	was	commonly	associated	with	freezing	of	the	distal	extremities	as	a	result	of	
vascular	constriction	(10).	The	Norwegian	Institute	for	Nature	Research	(NINA)	published	a	
review	 of	 capture	 related	 injuries	 in	 140	 Lynx	 trapped	 between	 1995-2007	 (11).	 They	
observed	no	injuries	in	box	trapped	individuals	or	in	Lynx	pursued	by	dogs	and	darted	in	trees.	
By	contrast	two	out	of	48	snare	trapped	individuals	were	euthanized	as	a	result	of	long	bone	
fractures	(11).	
	
The	Team	will	prioritize	the	health	and	welfare	of	donor	Lynx	by	employing	capture	methods	
that	maximize	success	and	minimize	stress	and	trauma.]	
	
4.3		Transport
18
	
	
Following	capture,	donor	Lynx	will	be	transferred	to	IATA	approved	travel	crates	and	driven	
to	the	nearest	airport	for	a	direct	flight	to	the	UK.	The	Team	will	aim	to	use	embarkation	and	
destination	airports	that	are	close	to	the	donor	and	destination	sites	in	Sweden	and	the	UK	
respectively.	The	veterinary	team	will	follow	expert	advice	regarding	the	need	for	chemical	
restraint	during	travel	to	ensure	the	health	and	welfare	of	animals	in	transit.	
	
Regulatory	compliance	regarding	the	capture	and	transport	of	donor	Lynx	will	be	achieved	
through	close	collaboration	between	 the	Team	and	 the	Swedish	EPA/SVA.	Permits	will	be	
acquired	 for	 the	 capture,	 transportation	 and	 import	 of	 Lynx	 to	 the	UK,	 including	 a	 CITES	
permit	from	the	EPA	(CITES	Appendix	II	species)	and	a	health	certificate	issued	by	Swedish	
official	veterinarians.	
	
4.4	Soft	Release
19
	
	
There	is	a	substantial	body	of	evidence	demonstrating	improved	survival	rates	in	translocated	
Lynx	following	a	‘soft	release’	programme	(12).	‘Hard	release'	involves	the	direct	release	of	
animals	to	the	wild	from	the	transit	cages.	‘Soft	release’	by	contrast	restricts	the	Lynx	to	an	
enclosure	in	which	they	can	shelter	and	where	they	receive	high	quality	nutrition.	After	a	pre-
determined	period,	the	door	to	the	soft	release	pen	is	left	open	to	allow	individuals	to	come	
and	go	at	will,	and	the	provision	of	food	is	continued	for	a	number	of	weeks.		
	
Shenk	 (12)	 evaluated	 release	 protocols	 of	 96	 European	 Lynx	 reintroduced	 to	 South	West	
Colorado,	by	the	Colorado	Parks	and	Wildlife	Service	in	1999	and	2000	(Table	2.).	
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Table	 2.	 Release	 protocols	 employed	 by	 the	 Colorado	 Parks	 and	 Wildlife	 Service	 to	
reintroduce	Lynx	during	1999	and	2000	(12)	
	
Release	
Protocol		
Description	
1	 Release	 females	 as	 soon	 as	 they	 pass	 veterinary	 inspection	 in	 Colorado.	 Release	males	 once	
females	appear	to	have	settled	into	an	area.		
	
2	 Release	males	or	females	after	they	have	been	held	in	Colorado	holding	facility	for	a	minimum	
of	3	weeks	and	fed	a	high	quality	diet.		
	
3	 Release	males	or	females	after	they	have	been	held	in	Colorado	holding	facility	for	a	minimum	
of	3	weeks,	fed	a	high	quality	diet,	and	released	no	earlier	than	May	1.		
	
3P	 Pregnant	females	released	under	Protocol	3.		
	
3P?	 Possibly	pregnant	females	released	under	Protocol	3.		
	
	
	
	
The	rate	of	survival	during	the	first	8	months’	post-release	increased	with	a	minimum	holding	
time	of	3	weeks	and	with	a	release	date	no	earlier	than	01	May	(12).	An	increased	mortality	
rate	from	starvation	was	observed	post-release	in	pregnant	and	juvenile	Lynx	(12).	
	
Further	 research	 relating	 to	 the	 Colorado	 Lynx	 reintroduction	 program	 (13)	 revealed	 that	
average	monthly	mortality	rates	during	the	first	year	decreased	with	time	in	captivity	from	
0.205	(95%	CI = 0.069,	0.475)	for	Lynx	having	spent	up	to	7	days	in	captivity	to	0.028	(95%	
CI = 0.012,	 0.064)	 for	 lynx	 spending	 >45	 days	 in	 captivity	 before	 release.	 No	 significant	
additional	increases	in	survival	rates	were	found	beyond	5-6	weeks	post-release	(13).	
	
Despite	 the	 additional	 costs	of	 a	 soft	 release	program,	 the	Team	will	 follow	 the	 available	
evidence	base	and	release	adult,	donor	Lynx	during	the	spring,	after	a	minimum	of	45	days	
spent	in	captive	release	pens.	This	approach	should	ensure	that	the	Lynx	are	in	good	body	
condition	at	the	time	of	release	and	that	they	benefit	from	the	seasonal	abundance	of	prey	
and	benign	environmental	conditions.	During	their	time	in	captivity,	all	contact	with	humans	
will	be	kept	to	a	minimum	to	avoid	stress	and	habituation.	
	
Prior	to	release,	all	animals	will	be	fitted	with	a	number	of	identifying	and	tracking	features.	
Each	 Lynx	 will	 have	 a	 GPS	 collar	 fitted	 and	 a	 subcutaneous	 microchip	 responder	 will	 be	
implanted.		
	
	
	
20
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5.	Hazard	Categories
2122
	
	
Table	3.	Hazard	Types	and	Definitions	According	to	Sainsbury	and	Vaughan-Higgins	(5)	and	
Masters	and	Sainsbury	(14).		
	
	Hazard	Type	 Definition	
Source	 Infections	 carried	 by	 translocated	 individuals	 from	 the	 source	
environment,	which	are	novel	(alien)	to	the	release	environment.	
Destination	
	
	
	
	
Infections	 and	 Welfare	 Hazards	 found	 at	 the	 release	 environment	 to	
which	the	translocated	animals	are	naïve.	
Carrier	
	
	
	
	
	
Those	commensal	organisms	that	cause	Infections	when	stressors	reduce	
host	immunocompetence	and	alter	the	host–parasite	relationship.	
Transport	 Infections	that	may	be	encountered	during	the	transport	 (between	the	
source	 and	 destination)	 which	 are	 novel	 to	 the	 translocated	 animals	
and/or	the	release	environment.	
Zoonotic	 Infections	carried	by	the	translocated	species	which	can	be	transmitted	
to	humans	and	potentially	harm	the	latter.	
Population	 Infections	and	Welfare	Hazards	present	at	 the	source	and	release	sites	
that	can	potentially	have	population	level	effects	at	the	release	site.	
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6.	Hazard	Identification
23
	
	
We	conducted	a	literature	review	and	sought	expert	opinion	to	compile	a	list	of	Infections	
and	Welfare	Hazards	that	were	carried	by	Lynx	as	the	definitive	or	accidental	host.	We	refined	
the	initial	list	to	identify	hazards,	by	filtering	those	agents	that	were	novel	to	the	host	and	had	
crossed	 an	 ecological	 or	 geographical	 barrier.	 	 Diseases	 that	 occurred	 at	 both	 donor	 and	
release	environments	were	excluded	as	hazards	unless	they	occurred	as	novel	subtypes,	were	
notifiable	to	the	local	authority	 in	the	destination	environment	or	constituted	a	significant	
population	and/or	zoonotic	risk.	
	
We	considered	the	potential	impacts	of	each	hazard	on	the	Trial	Animals,	sympatric	species	
of	 wildlife,	 livestock,	 pets	 and	 humans	 at	 all	 stages	 of	 the	 translocation	 pathway,	 in	 the	
absence	of	mitigation.		We	employed	a	traffic	light	system	to	display	the	potential	 level	of	
severity	of	each	hazard,	determine	the	extent	of	risk	assessment	required	and	ensure	that	
mitigation	was	proportionate	(Table	4).		
	
From	an	initial	list	comprising	59	Infections	and	4	Welfare	Hazards	(Appendix	4.)	(15	viruses,	
13	bacteria,	5	ectoparasites,	19	endoparasites,	6	protozoa,	1	fungi	and	4	Welfare	Hazards)	we	
assigned	 5	 Infections	 (rabies	 virus,	 Fransicella	 tularensis,	 Sarcoptes	 scabei,	 tick-borne	
encephalitis	 virus	 and	 Echinococcus	 multilocularis)	 and	 2	 Welfare	 Hazards
24
	 (illegal	
persecution,	generic	stress)	to	the	red	colour	code	category.	
	
Table	 4.	 Definitions	 of	 traffic	 light	 colour	 categories	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 impact	 level,	 and	
requirement	for	risk	assessment	and	disease	mitigation	measures.	
	
	Colour	Categories	 Definition	of	Traffic	Light	Categories		
	
Red	
Severe	impacts	at	an	individual	or	population	level	
Full	risk	assessment	recommended	
Mitigation	measures	essential	
	
	
Amber	
Moderate	impacts	at	an	individual	or	population	level	
Partial	risk	assessment	recommended		
Mitigation	measures	advisable	
	
	
Green	
Negligible	impacts	at	an	individual	or	population	level	
Risk	assessment	not	required	
Mitigation	measures	not	required	
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7.	Risk	Assessment
25
	
	
The	risk	assessment	follows	the	identification	and	categorization	of	individual	Infections	and	
Welfare	Hazards	and	describes	the	biological	pathways	for	each	hazard	from	the	acquisition	
of	disease	at	the	donor	site	to	the	release	and	spread	at	the	release	site.		
	
The	 assessment	 of	 disease	 risk	 incorporates	 the	 likelihood	 of	 Lynx	 carrying	 and	 releasing	
Infections	at	the	recipient	site	(release	assessment),	the	probability	of	disease	transmission	
to	Lynx	and	sympatric,	resident	species	at	the	release	site	(wildlife,	domestic	livestock,	pets	
and	 humans)	 (exposure	 assessment)	 and	 the	 likelihood	 and	 severity	 of	 biological,	
environmental	and	economic	consequences	of	the	disease	(consequence	assessment).	The	
overall	qualitative	risk	estimation	(Table	5.)	for	Infections	and	Welfare	Hazards	combines	the	
results	of	the	release,	exposure	and	consequence	assessments.	The	definitions	of	qualitative	
likelihoods	that	are	used	in	the	Risk	Estimation	Matrix	(Table	5.)	(negligible,	very	low,	low,	
medium	or	high)	were	established	on	the	basis	of	subjective,	logical,	referenced	discussion	
(Table	6.)	
	
	
Table	5.	Risk	Estimation	Matrix	
	
Lik
e
lih
o
o
d
	o
f	re
le
a
se
	a
n
d
	e
xp
o
su
re
	
High		 Negligible	
risk	
	
Very	low	
risk	
Low	risk	 Moderate	
risk	
High	risk	
Moderate	 Negligible	
risk	
	
Very	low	
risk	
Low	risk	 Moderate	
risk	
High	risk	
Low	 Negligible	
risk	
	
Negligible	
risk	
Very	low	
risk	
Low	risk	 Moderate	
risk	
Very	Low	 Negligible	
risk	
	
Negligible	
risk	
Negligible	
risk	
Low	risk	 Moderate	
risk	
Negligible	 Negligible	
risk	
	
Negligible	
risk	
Negligible	
risk	
Negligible	
risk	
Negligible	
risk	
	 Negligible	
	
Very	low	 Low	 Moderate	 High	
Likelihood	and	severity	of	consequences	
	
	 Consequences	of	release	and	exposure	
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Table	6.	Definitions	of	qualitative	likelihoods.	
	
Likelihood	 Descriptive	definition	
High	 The	event	is	very	likely	to	occur	
	
Moderate	 The	event	will	occur	with	an	even	probability	
	
Low	 The	event	is	unlikely	to	occur	
	
Very	Low	 The	event	is	very	unlikely	to	occur		
	
Negligible	 The	event	will	almost	certainly	not	occur	
	
	
	
7.1	Release,	exposure	and	consequence	assessments	
	
Release	Assessment	
	
Release	in	this	context	relates	to	the	introduction	into	the	environment	or	direct	transmission	
to	another	individual,	of	an	Infection	carried	by	the	Trial	Animals.	Release	assessments	are	
not	required	for	destination	hazards	or	for	source/transport/carrier/zoonotic	hazards	where	
the	likelihood	of	release	is	negligeable.	Release	assessments	do	not	apply	to	Welfare	Hazards.	
	
Exposure	Assessments	
	
Exposure	 assessments	 evaluate	 the	 risk	 of	 disease	 transmission	 from	 Lynx	 to	 sympatric	
resident	species	at	the	release	site	and	vice	versa.	For	Welfare	Hazards,	exposure	assessments	
will	determine	the	susceptibility	of	a	species	acquiring	or	encountering	the	hazard.	
	
Consequence	Assessment	
	
Consequence	assessment	determines	the	severity	and	likelihood	of	biological,	environmental	
and	 economic	 consequences	 given	 the	 release	 and	 exposure	 of	 Infections	 and	 Welfare	
Hazards.	
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8.	Mitigation	Strategy
26
	
	
The	Mitigation	(“Mitigation”)	strategy	 is	designed	to	provide	an	overview	of	the	measures	
recommended	for	implementation	at	each	stage	of	the	translocation	pathway,	to	minimize	
the	risk	of	Infections		and	Welfare	Hazards	in	the	founder	Lynx	and	the	resident	wildlife,	pets,	
livestock	and	human	populations	in	the	release	environment.	The	strategy	will	focus	on	red	
colour-coded	hazards	with	 the	potential	 for	 severe	 impacts	at	an	 individual	or	population	
level.	 Hazard-specific	 recommendations	 will	 include	 management	 measures,	 diagnostic	
testing	and	preventative	healthcare	treatments,	but	it	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	document	
to	provide	details	of	pharmacological	products	and	dosages.	
	
8.1	Pre-Export	
	
Following	capture	in	Sweden	and	prior	to	export,	thorough	non-invasive	clinical	observations	
of	the	Lynx	will	be	conducted	at	regular	intervals	in	the	holding	facility.	These	observations	
should	be	conducted	during	the	day	and	at	night	using	a	thermal	scope	to	account	for	their	
nocturnal	activity	patterns.	The	veterinary	team	will	evaluate	the	physical	condition,	general	
demeanor,	 appetite	 and	 thirst,	 mobility	 and	 behaviour	 of	 the	 Lynx.	 Furthermore,	
observations	 will	 identify	 hazard	 specific	 symptoms	 such	 as	 pruritis	 (Sarcoptes	 scabei,	
Otodectes	cynotis)	and	evidence	of	stress	induced	trauma	to	distal	extremities.	The	detection	
of	 clinical	 disease	 symptoms	 will,	 at	 the	 discretion	 of	 the	 veterinary	 team,	 result	 in	 the	
provision	of	therapeutic	treatments	pre-transport,	or	the	removal	of	the	individual	from	the	
translocation	project.		
	
Prior	to	travel,	a	general	anaesthetic	will	be	administered	to	conduct	a	physical	examination,	
collect	 biological	 samples	 for	 diagnostic	 screening,	 apply	 prophylactic	 and	 therapeutic	
treatments	and	take	morphometric	measurements.	To	mitigate	 the	risks	of	morbidity	and	
mortality	 associated	 with	 anaesthesia,	 the	 veterinary	 team	 will	 employ	 best	 practice	
protocols	devised	by	Norwegian	School	of	Veterinary	Science	in	Tromsø	(15).	Routine	checks	
will	include	cardiac	auscultation	and	otoscopic/opthalmoscopic	examination	of	the	ears	and	
eyes	respectively.	Examination	of	the	skin	will	identify	dermatological	lesions	and	evidence	of	
ectoparasites	and	palpation/manipulation	of	the	bones	and	joints	will	reveal	musculoskeletal	
abnormalities	such	as	traumatic	injuries.		
	
Biological	 samples	 including	 blood,	 urine,	 tissue,	 faeces	 and	 conjunctival/oropharyngeal	
swabs	will	be	taken	for	immediate	analysis	at	the	Swedish	National	Veterinary	Institute	(SVA)	
and	for	storage	at	-80
0
C	to	enable	retrospective	testing	as	required.	Serum	and	EDTA	samples	
will	 be	 analyzed	 for	 routine	 biochemistry	 and	 hematology	 and	 specifically	 for	 Sarcoptes	
scabei,	Francisella	tularensis	and	Tick-borne	encephalitis	virus	(TBEV)	antibodies	by	enzyme-
linked	immuno-sorbent	assay	(ELISA).	Blood	smears	will	be	examined	for	haemoparasites	and	
skin	scrapes	will	be	assessed	microscopically	for	evidence	of	Sarcoptes	scabei.
		
Faecal	analysis	
will	include	routine	microscopy	for	endoparasites,	routine	culture	for	pathogenic	bacteria,	as	
well	as	hazard	specific	coproantigen	ELISA	testing	for	Echinococcus	multilocularis.		
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Prophylactic	 interventions	 administered	 prior	 to	 export	 comprise	 vaccinations	 and	
treatments	 against	 endoparasites	 and	 ectoparasites.	 Only	 inactivated	 vaccines	 should	 be	
utilized,	to	prevent	vaccine-induced	disease	and	post-vaccine	shedding.	Despite	the	low	level	
of	risk	associated	with	feline	leukaemia	virus	(FeLV),	feline	calicivirus	(FCV),	feline	herpesvirus	
(FHV),	feline	parvovirus	(FPV)	and	canine	distemper	virus	(CDV)	in	Lynx,	vaccinations	should	
be	 considered	 to	 reduce	 transmission	 from	 feral	 cats	 and	 foxes	 in	 the	 destination	
environment.	Anthelmintics	with	proven	efficacy	against	Echinococcus	multilocularis	should	
be	given	and	ectoparasiticides	should	be	effective	against	Sarcoptes	scabei	as	well	as	ticks,	
fleas	and	lice.	Therapeutic	treatments	will	only	be	administered	on	a	case	by	case	basis	as	and	
when	required.	
	
8.2	Transport	
	
The	management	and	mitigation	of	transport	related	stress	is	discussed	in	the	‘Generic	Stress’	
risk	assessment	in	Appendix	2.	To	avoid	the	transport	of	fomites	and	vectors	that	could	carry	
Infections,	biosecurity	measures	must	be	maintained	to	the	highest	standards	in	transit	from	
Sweden	to	the	UK.	IATA	compliant	travel	crates	should	be	disinfected	pre-travel	with	a	non-
toxic,	viricidal/bacteriocidal	disinfectant	that	meets	all	regulatory	and	accreditation	standards	
and	is	DEFRA	approved.	Particular	attention	should	be	paid	to	eliminating	arthropod	vectors	
pre-travel	 and	 the	 travel	 crates	 should	 not	 be	 in	 the	 proximity	 of	 other	 animals	 during	
transport.			
	
8.3	Release	Enclosures	
	
Strict	biosecurity	standards	must	be	adhered	to	in	the	soft-release	enclosures.	These	include	
the	disinfection	of	all	building	materials	used	in	the	construction	of	enclosures	and	the	regular	
disinfection	of	utensils.	Wild	prey	such	as	roe	deer	should	be	provided	to	mimic	the	natural	
diet	 to	which	 the	 Lynx	were	 accustomed	 in	 the	 source	 environment.	 Veterinary	 staff	will	
conduct	 meat	 inspections	 prior	 to	 feeding	 wild	 prey	 to	 identify	 lesions	 associated	 with	
infectious	disease	such	as	Mycobacterium	bovis	and	Sarcoptes	scabei.	The	provision	of	fresh	
or	 frozen	 carcasses	 will	 help	 to	 prevent	 bacterial	 contamination	 with	 pathogens	 such	 as	
Salmonella	 and	 Campylobacter	 species.	 If	 flowing	 water	 is	 not	 available	 in	 the	 release	
enclosure,	standing	water	sources	should	be	refilled	on	a	regular	basis.	Cage	design	should	
exclude	cats	and	dogs	from	the	enclosures	to	avoid	exposing	the	Lynx	to	common	canine	and	
feline	diseases	such	as	FeLV,	FIV,	FCH	and	FHV.	Enclosure	management	plans	should	advise	
against	the	Lynx	Team	bringing	cats	and	dogs	anywhere	near	the	enclosure	compound.		
	
The	enclosures	should	be	managed	by	experienced	feline	handlers	who	will	adhere	to	a	strict	
cleaning	 and	 maintenance	 rota.	 Regular	 clinical	 observations	 to	 monitor	 the	 health	 and	
welfare	of	the	Lynx,	should	be	implemented	during	the	day	and	night	as	stipulated	in	the	pre-
export	period.	Therapeutic	 interventions	will	only	be	carried	out	on	a	case	by	case	basis	 if	
symptoms	of	disease	have	been	identified.	Repeated	non-invasive	faecal	testing	will	help	to	
monitor	parasite	 loads	and	could	be	used	to	evaluate	stress	through	the	analysis	of	faecal	
glucocorticoid	metabolite	(FGM)	levels.		
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Prior	 to	 release	 a	 second	 anaesthetic	 will	 be	 administered,	 to	 enable	 a	 comprehensive	
physical	 examination	 and	 weight	 check	 to	 be	 carried	 out	 and	 to	 fit	 individual	 Lynx	 with	
satellite	 collars.	 The	 detection	 of	 clinical	 disease	 symptoms	 will,	 at	 the	 discretion	 of	 the	
veterinary	team,	result	in	the	provision	of	therapeutic	treatments	pre-release	or	the	removal	
of	the	individual	from	the	translocation	project.		
	
8.4	Post-release	
	
Following	release,	the	Lynx	will	be	satellite	tracked	in	real	time	to	monitor	their	movements	
and	alert	farmers	of	the	proximity	of	Lynx	to	livestock,	as	discussed	in	the	risk	assessment	for	
‘Illegal	 Persecution’	 in	 Appendix	 2.	 It	 is	 imperative	 that	 the	 community	 engagement	
programme	implemented	prior	to	the	licensing	stage	is	continued	in	the	release	zone	post-
licensing.	This	will	help	to	inform	the	community	of	the	mitigation	measures	that	have	been	
applied	 to	 protect	 local	 wildlife,	 domestic	 pets	 and	 livestock	 and	 promote	 the	 peaceful	
coexistence	of	humans	and	Lynx	in	the	Kielder	Forest.		
	
Despite	the	challenges	of	monitoring	the	health	of	Lynx	in	the	post-release	period,	camera	
trap	images	and	non-invasive	scat	analysis	will	provide	some	information	regarding	the	health	
status	and	dietary	preferences	of	the	founder	Lynx	population.		
	
8.5	Post-mortem	examination	
	
Lynx	mortality	events	will	be	 investigated	at	all	 stages	of	 the	 translocation	pathway	by	Dr	
Julian	 Chantrey	 from	 the	 University	 of	 Liverpool	 Veterinary	 Institute	 according	 to	 the	
necropsy	 protocol	 outlined	 in	 Appendix	 3.	 Diagnostic	 tests	 will	 include	 gross	 necropsy,	
histopathology	 and	 toxicology	 screens	 and	 the	 cause	 of	 death	 will	 inform	 the	mitigation	
strategy	 and	 assist	 in	 protecting	 the	 remaining	 founder	 Lynx	 population.	 Necropsy	
examinations	will	also	extend	to	any	large	prey	species	(roe	deer,	fox)	that	are	found	dead	in	
the	proximity	of	the	soft	release	enclosures.			
	
	
9	Consultations
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10	Discussion	
	
This	DRA	is	intended	for	use	by	all	parties	involved	in	the	proposed	Lynx	reintroduction	Project	
including	 the	 Lynx	 Trust	 Team	 as	 well	 as	 the	 statutory	 authorities	 (NE,	 SNH,APHA)	 and	
Swedish	 Partners	 (“Swedish	 Partners”).	 The	 most	 labour-intensive	 and	 financially	 costly	
interventions	are	largely	concerned	with	the	Swedish	stages	of	the	programme.	Interventions	
at	UK	release	pens	are	less	onerous	and	rely	partially	on	clinical	observation	and	animal	and	
enclosure	management	skills	of	the	staff	involved.		
	
Our	mitigation	strategy	was	formulated	in	the	light	of	the	risk	assessment	process	which	has	
drawn	on	a	 reference	 library	of	published	articles	 relating	 in	some	part	 to	 feline	diseases.	
There	 were	 many	 instances	 where	 the	 certainty	 level	 of	 our	 risk	 assessments	 was	
compromised	by	lack	of	disease	surveillance	data	both	in	Sweden	and	UK,	and	lack	of	data	on	
disease	 in	wild	felids,	 leading	to	assumptions	relating	to	predicted	prevalence	and/or	Lynx	
disease	susceptibility.		
	
The	UK	government’s	regulatory	APHA	is	mainly	concerned	with	the	introduction	of	exotic	
Swedish	Infections	resulting	from	the	Trial,		however	the	threat	of	these	Infections	to	the	UK	
is	greatly	diminished	by	the	infrequent	and	sporadic	nature	of	all	Infections	for	which	the	Lynx	
is	 an	 accidental	 host.	 The	 largely	 solitary	 nature	 of	 the	 lynx	 and	 overall	 low	 population	
densities	at	which	it	lives,	even	in	optimal	habitat,	mean	Infections	are	relatively	rare	in	this	
species.		
	
The	threat	of	endemic	UK	disease	to	the	newly	introduced	Trial	Animals	is	of	lesser	concern	
for	 the	 UK	 animal	 health	 authorities	 but	 is	 difficult	 to	 accurately	 assess	 due	 to	 many	
unknowns.		As	an	example,	sarcoptic	mange	is	endemic	at	low	levels	in	the	fox	population	in	
Kielder.	Lynx	can	contract	this	parasitic	disease	from	fox	prey	and	may	be	clinically	affected,	
however	British	mange	strains	may	differ	 in	virulence	from	mainland	European	types.	This	
could	 hold	 true	 for	 a	 range	 of	 endemic	 UK	 infections	 reservoired	 in	 wildlife	 species	 eg.		
hantavirus,	louping	ill	virus,	Anaplasma	spp,	cowpox	virus,	Borrelia	burgdorferi	etc	however,	
the	likelihood	is	their	virulence	is	not	significantly	different	between	the	two	countries.	
	
Without	disease	specific	Mitigation	measures,	Infections	could	reduce	the	survival	rates	and	
reproductive	potential	of	the	Trial	Animals.	However	The	DRA	findings	indicate	that	the	five	
red	coded	pathogens,	can	all	be	mitigated	by	simple	procedures	such	as	selecting	the	lynx	
from	disease	 free	areas	 (Sweden	 for	 rabies);	 treating	all	 imported	 lynx	with	anthelmintics	
(Echinococcus)	 or	 acaricide	 drugs	 (TBEV,	 Tularaemia,	 mange)	 or	 a	 combination	 of	 these	
factors	(Echinococcus/	Tularaemia).	Therefore	it	is	likely	that	anthropogenic	Welfare	Hazards	
such	as	illegal	persecution	will	pose	a	greater	threat	to	the	Lynx	than	Infections	acquired	along	
the	translocation	pathway
16
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13.	Appendices
28
	
	
Appendix	1.		
Individual	Disease	Risk	Assessments:	Infections	
	
A) Rabies	Virus	 Hazard	Categories	(Zoonotic/Source/Population)	
Justification	for	Hazard	Status	 Rabies	is	an	encephalitis	caused	by	rabies	virus,	a	member	of	the	Rhabdoviridae	family.	It	is	an	acute	
zoonotic	viral	infection	that	is	almost	invariably	fatal	in	humans	once	symptoms	develop.	Transmission	is	
generally	through	the	bite	of	an	infected	animal,	usually	dogs	but	also	cats,	bats	and	other	wildlife	(1).	In	
humans,	a	course	of	rabies	vaccination	can	prevent	infection	and	death.	The	European	distribution	of	rabies	
is	in	the	far	east	with	endemic	foci	being	present	in	Turkey	and	former	Eastern	bloc	countries	(2).	Two	
epidemiological	life	cycles	exist,	sylvatic	rabies	for	which	the	red	fox	(Vulpes	vulpes)	is	the	wildlife	reservoir	
and	urban	rabies	which	is	present	in	dogs	(3).	Both	types	may	occur	in	an	outbreak	but	urban	canine	rabies	
is	by	far	more	important	for	public	health	and	contributes	to	99%	to	the	human	death	toll	(2).	Transmission	
of	the	virus	can	also	occur	to	a	wide	variety	of	other	mammalian	species,	including	cats.		
	
Risk	Assessment	
Release	Assessment	 The	UK	(since	1922)	and	Sweden	(since	1886)	are	categorised	as	being	free	of	rabies	(4),	as	is	Finland,	so	the	
nearest	overland	sites	of	endemic	rabies	infection	from	NE	Sweden	are	in	north	western	Russia	(over	
250km	distant)	(2).		
	
In	Europe,	the	main	reservoir	host	species	for	rabies	is	the	red	fox	which	acquires	infection	by	fighting	or	
saliva	contact	with	infected	animals.	The	susceptibility	of	animals	to	rabies	varies	depending	on	the	species	
but	felids	are	only	moderately	susceptible	(5).	Furthermore,	cats	usually	get	infected	through	perforating	
bite	wounds	rather	than	through	ingestion	of	an	infected	prey	item	(6).	Although	there	is	no	documented	
evidence	of	rabies	infection	in	Swedish	lynx	(7),	sporadic	cases	of	rabies	have	been	diagnosed	in	lynx	
elsewhere.	In	Slovakia,	Fernex	(8)	identified	six	of	a	thousand	(0.6%)	lynx	caught	or	killed	in	a	ten-year	
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period	had	rabies.	All	six	showed	the	paralytic	signs	of	the	disease	(dumb	rabies),	with	absence	of	
aggression,	however,	a	case	of	rabid	lynx	showing	aggression	(furious	rabies)	has	also	been	described	once	
(9).		
	
Thus	with	very	low	rates	of	infection,	a	low	density	population	made	up	of	solitary	individuals	and	less	
susceptibility	to	infection	compared	to	foxes,	the	Lynx	is	not	thought	to	play	a	significant	role	in	the	
epidemiology	of	rabies	in	Europe.	
Exposure	Assessment	 Rabies	virus	is	only	present	in	the	saliva	or	CNS	tissue	of	the	infected	animal	and	once	outside	the	host	the	
virus	is	inactivated	by	high	temperatures	(>21oC),	desiccation	and	exposure	to	sunlight	(1)	but	it	can	remain	
infectious	for	extended	periods	at	low	or	freezing	temperatures	(3).	In	carnivores,	wild	canids	are	
considered	to	be	easily	infected,	whereas	cats	are	much	less	susceptible	(10).		Rabies	incubation	times	
depend	on	viral	quantity,	virulence	and	location	of	the	inoculation	site	but	the	average	is	2	to	8	weeks.		The	
virus	may	be	present	in	saliva	from	an	infected	animal	up	to	five	days	before	the	outbreak	of	clinical	
symptoms	(9).			
Consequence	Assessment	 The	release	and	exposure	of	rabies	virus	in	the	UK	could	present	a	risk	to	public	health	and	would	have	
environmental	and	economic	consequences	as	a	result	of	the	necessity	for	dogs	to	be	vaccinated	against	
rabid	foxes.	The	increased	risk	of	humans	contracting	rabies	through	handling	of	dogs	(or	foxes)	may	
occasionally	lead	to	clinical	cases	and	necessitate	human	vaccination,	treatment	and	hospitalization	(11).		
The	mitigation	of	rabies	in	wildlife	populations	would	require	perimeter	vaccination	of	foxes	around	the	
release	site	by	the	Department	of	Agriculture,	Environment	and	Rural	Affairs		(DEFRA)	within	and	beyond	
the	Kielder	area,	however,	vaccination	has	proven	highly	effective	in	eliminating	rabies	from	fox	
populations	in	western	Europe	(12).	
Despite	the	significant	nature	of	the	consequences,	the	low	probability	of	occurrence,	release	and	exposure	
all	reduce	the	likelihood	of	serious	consequences	occurring.				
Overall	Risk	Estimation	 Very	low.		
	
Risk	Management	 The	statutory	UK	4	month	quarantine	period	either	at	the	release	site	or	in	Sweden	will	outlast	the	
incubation	period	so	disease	would	occur	in	and	be	confined	to	quarantine	facilities.		In	addition,	DEFRA	
may	grant	quarantine	exemption	given	the	source	country	is	rabies	free.	
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B)	Tick	borne	encephalitis	virus	 Hazard	Categories	(Zoonotic/Source/Population)	
Justification	for	Hazard	Status	
	
Tick-Borne	Encephalitis	(TBE)	is	a	viral	disease	caused	by	a	member	of	the	Flavivirus	family.	The	European	
distribution	 of	 TBE	 is	 in	 central	 and	northern	 Europe,	 and	 in	 Sweden,	 the	 risk	 is	 present	 throughout	 the	
country	but	particularly	in	the	south	east	(3).	It	is	an	acute	zoonotic	viral	infection	that	occasionally	causes	
serious	neurological	disease	in	humans,	however,	the	vast	majority	of	those	who	are	infected	will	have	mild	
or	no	symptoms.	Ticks	act	as	both	the	vector	and	reservoir	for	TBE	and	transmission	is	generally	through	the	
bite	of	an	infected	Ixodes	ricinus	or	Ixodes	persulcatus	(1).	The	main	hosts	are	small	rodents	but	larger	animals	
(eg.	deer)	although	serving	as	 feeding	hosts	 for	 the	 ticks,	do	not	play	a	 role	 in	maintenance	of	 the	virus.		
Humans	are	accidental	hosts	(4)	and	the	European	human	case	fatality	rate	is	less	than	2%	but	about	46%	of	
diagnosed	patients	suffer	permanent	neurological	sequelae	[2].	Person-to-person	transmission	has	not	been	
reported	with	the	exception	of	vertical	transmission,	from	an	infected	mother	to	foetus	(4).	Louping	ill	virus	
(LIV)	is	a	related	member	of	this	Flavivirus	family	and	is	endemic	in	sheep	and	hares	in	the	UK,	and	other	parts	
of	Europe	(7).	It	causes	disease	primarily	in	sheep	and	has	been	reported	as	the	cause	of	a	TBE-like	illness	in	
people	 (4).	 Unlike	 TBE,	 LIV	 causes	 viraemia	 and	 fatal	 encephalomyelitis	 in	 domesticated	 animals	 when	
infected	ticks	feed	on	them	(5).			
Risk	Assessment	
Release	Assessment	 There	are	no	scientific	records	of	Lynx	being	 infected	with	TBE,	nor	being	exposed	from	positive	serology	
results.		Larger	species,	like	deer,	are	dead-end	hosts	for	the	virus	(Carpi	2008)	so	it	is	probable	that	Lynx	also	
act	similarly,	acting	as	accidental	hosts.	The	only	documented	native	UK	species	rodent	species	 in	Kielder	
forest	capable	of	allowing	TBE	to	replicate	is	the	bank	vole	(Myodes	glareolus)(10).		
As	the	TBE	virus	 is	transovarially	transmitted	(9),	the	risk	 is	 importing	Lynx	which	have	feeding	adult	ticks	
which	can	then	reproduce,	fall	off	and	these	surviving	larvae	parasitise	UK	bank	voles,	so	re-establishing	the	
TBE	infection	cycle.		
The	Lynx	is	not	thought	to	play	a	significant	role	in	the	epidemiology	of	TBE	in	Europe.	
Exposure	Assessment	 The	main	vector	for	TBE	virus	(TBE)	transmission		to	humans	in	Sweden	is	the	nymph	stage	of	the	common	
tick,	 Ixodes	 ricinus.	 The	 main	 mode	 of	 transmission	 and	 maintenance	 of	 TBE	 in	 the	 tick	 population	 is	
considered	to	be	when	infective	nymphs	co-feed	with	uninfected	but	susceptible	larvae	on	rodents	(within	
the	UK	this	would	be	the	bank	vole).	In	wildlife,	the	roe	deer,	Capreolus	capreolus	is	the	main	host	for	the	
reproducing	adult	I.	ricinus	ticks	(11).			Ixodes	ricinus	ticks	can	feed	on	Lynx	but	this	is	less	common	than	deer	
(12).		
	 30	
Consequence	Assessment	 The	release	and	exposure	of	TBE	virus	in	the	UK	could	present	a	risk	to	public	health	and	would	have	economic	
and	environmental	consequences	as	a	result	of	the	infection	becoming	established	within	the	UK	bank	vole	
population.	The	increased	risk	of	humans	contracting	TBE	through	being	fed	on	by	infected	ticks	could	lead	
to	clinical	cases	and	necessitate	vaccination	and	treatment.		
Despite	the	serious	and	intractable	nature	of	TBE	infection,	the	low	probability	of	occurrence,	release	and	
exposure	all	reduce	the	likelihood	of	serious	consequences	occurring.			
Overall	Risk	Estimation	 Moderate.		
Risk	Managment	 The	mitigation	of	TBE	virus	in	wildlife	populations	is	difficult.	Preventative	measures	such	as	vaccination	of	
forestry	workers	and	farmers	in	the	local	Kielder	area	have	proven	efficacy	in	protecting	the	target	human	
susceptible	population	in	Sweden	(11).	
Acaricide	 treatment	 such	 as	 ivermectin	 and	 screening	 of	 the	 Lynx	 post-capture	 and	 pre-travel	 to	 the	UK	
should	prevent	any	TBE	infected	ticks	being	imported	into	the	UK.			
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C)	Echinococcus	
multilocularis	
Hazard	Categories	(Zoonotic/Source/Population)	
Justification	for	Hazard	
Status	
Alveolar	echinococcosis	caused	by	Echinococcus	multilocularis	(EM)	constitutes	one	of	the	most	pathogenic	
zoonoses	in	temperate	and	arctic	areas	of	the	Northern	hemisphere	(1).	Human	infection	is	acquired	through	the	
ingestion	of	eggs	excreted	in	the	faeces	of	the	definitive	host		and	is	characterized	by	a	prolonged	incubation	
period	of	up	to	15	years	followed	by	a	potentially	fatal	infiltrative	tumour-like	disease	in	the	liver	and	other	
associated	organs	(2).	The	UK	is	currently	listed	as	free	of	EM	and	DEFRA	conducts	routine	surveillance	of	fox	
carcasses	in	the	UK	(3).	Prior	to	2010,	EM	had	never	been	detected	in	Sweden,	but	following	the	discovery	of	
infected	foxes	in	Denmark,	a	national	monitoring	programme	was	established	based	on	analysis	of	fox	scat	to	
determine	the	prevalence	and	distribution	of	EM	in	Sweden	(4).	In	2011,	one	infected	fox	was	diagnosed	in	South-
West	Sweden	(Västra	Götaland	County).	During	2012-2014,	active	monitoring	of	shot	foxes	was	continued	by	the	
board	of	agriculture	and	three	positive	cases	were	diagnosed	from	2779	fox	scat	samples	in	the	municipalities	of	
Uddevalla,	Katrineholm,	and	Gnesta	(4).	Furthermore,	a	project	led	by	the	University	of	Agricultural	Sciences	
(SLU),	to	determine	the	prevalence	of	EM	in	rodent	intermediate	hosts	confirmed	one	case	of	EM	in	a	water	vole	
(Arvicola	species)	(4).	EM	is	considered	to	be	endemic	with	a	low	prevalence	in	Sweden.			
Risk	Assessment	
Release	Assessment	 The	most	common	definitive	host	for	EM	is	the	red	fox	(Vulpes	vulpes),	although	sexual	reproduction	of	the	
parasite	can	also	occur	in	other	members	of	the	family	canidae	(4).	Foxes	acquire	the	infection	by	ingesting	
rodent	intermediate	hosts.	Although	there	is	no	evidence	of	EM	infection	in	Swedish	lynx	(2),	cats	can	act	as	
definitive	hosts	under	natural	and	experimental	conditions	(5,6,7).	In	Europe	EM	has	been	diagnosed	in	cats	from	
Baden-Württemburg,	Germany	(6),	and	the	Saubian	Alps,	Germany	(5).		Vogel	(1957)	succeeded	in	infecting	5	of	6	
cats	with	EM	from	southern	Germany,	but	noted	that	felines	were	poor	hosts	on	the	basis	that	they	produced	
smaller	worms	and	fewer	eggs.	The	definitive	hosts	of	EM	remain	asymptomatic	so	there	is	a	low	likelihood	that	
untreated	Lynx	could	contaminate	the	destination	environment	by	carrying	infection	and	releasing	eggs	in	their	
stools.	
Exposure	Assessment	 The	eggs	of	EM	are	rapidly	killed	by	high	temperatures	and	desiccation,	but	experimental	evidence	from	South	
West	Germany	established	a	maximum	survival	time	of	240	days	under	benign	environmental	conditions	during	
the	autumn	and	winter	(8).	Eggs	shed	in	the	environment	could	infect	rodent	intermediate	hosts	and	result	in	the	
transmission	of	EM	to	red	foxes.	Furthermore,	animal	handlers	including	scientists	and	wildlife	veterinarians	
could	contract	EM	by	handling	infected	Lynx	during	capture,	transport	and	disease	monitoring.	However,	the	
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likelihood	of	exposure	remains	low	as	felines	only	constitute	accidental	hosts	for	EM	and	the	disease	has	never	
been	diagnosed	in	Swedish	lynx	(2).			
Consequence	
Assessment	
The	release	and	exposure	of	EM	to	the	UK	could	pose	a	serious	risk	to	public	health	and	would	have	economic	
and	environmental	consequences.	The	increased	risk	of	humans	contracting	alveolar	echinococcosis	could	lead	to	
clinical	cases	and	necessitate	expensive	treatments	including	surgical	resection	of	hydatid	cysts	in	the	liver	and	
long	term	chemotherapy.		
The	circulation	of	the	parasite	in	fox	and	rodent	populations	would	require	intense	surveillance	of	fox	
scat/carcasses	by	DEFRA	within	and	beyond	the	Kielder	area.		
Despite	the	severe	nature	of	the	consequences,	the	low	probability	of	release	and	exposure	also	reduces	the	
likelihood	of	consequences	occurring.	
Overall	Risk	Estimation	 Low	
Risk	Management	 Praziquantel	(5mg/kg)	has	proven	efficacy	against	EM	and	will	be	administered	to	all	Trial	Animals	
prior	to	treatment	faecal	testing	for	coproantigen	(CoproAntigen	ELISA)	will	be	carried	out	on	all	Lynx	and	ELISA	
positive	cases	will	be	examined	using	sedimentation	and	counting	techniques.	
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D)	Sarcoptes	scabei	 Hazard	Categories	(Zoonotic/Population/Carrier)	
Justification	for	
Hazard	Status	
Sarcoptic	mange	is	a	highly	contagious	epizootic	disease	caused	by	the	Sarcoptes	scabei,	a	submacroscopic	
burrowing	skin	mite	(1).	Infection	has	been	recorded	in	104	wild	and	domestic	species	but	is	most	prevalent	in	red	
foxes	(Vulpes	vulpes)	and	grey	wolves	(Canis	lupus)	in	North	America	and	red	foxes	and	dingoes	(Canis	familiaris	
dingo)	in	Australia	(2).		
	
Sarcoptic	mange	was	unrecorded	in	Scandinavia	until	1967	when	it	was	diagnosed	in	a	red	fox	in	the	South	West	of	
Finland	and	in	a	Swedish	red	fox	in	1972	(3).	The	subsequent	spread	of	Sarcoptes	scabei	in	Sweden	was	
determined	by	the	population	dynamics	of	the	red	fox	and	resulted	in	the	first	positive	diagnosis	in	Lynx	in	1980	
(3).	Sarcoptic	mange	now	constitutes	the	most	common	infectious	disease	of	Lynx	in	Europe,	and	is	characterized	
by	chronic	dermatological	lesions	culminating	in	emaciation,	dehydration,	cachexia	and	a	high	mortality	rate	(4,1).	
In	2014	the	SVA		diagnosed	10	cases	of	sarcoptic	mange	from	77	fallen	Lynx,	as	part	of	their	annual	infectious	
disease	monitoring	programme	(4).	Sarcoptic	mange	is	widespread	in	The	UK	with	the	highest	estimated	
prevalence	in	central	and	southern	England	and	a	reduced	incidence	in	the	North	of	England	and	Scotland	(5).		
	
Human	scabies	does	not	constitute	a	major	public	health	concern	as	zoonotic	infections	are	commonly	short	term,	
self	limiting	and	characterized	by	mild	dermatological	symptoms	(1).	
	
Risk	Assessment	
Release	Assessment	 Sarcoptic	mange	has	a	protracted	incubation	of	10-72	days	and	a	prolonged	disease	period	to	death	(6).	
Furthermore,	the	ectoparasite	can	survive	in	dead	skin	squames	for	prolonged	periods	in	the	environment	under	
optimal	climatic	conditions	(5).	Ryser-Degiorgis	et	al.,	(2002)	documented	the	capture	of	an	asymptomatic	carrier	
Lynx	in	Switzerland	that	died	from	sarcoptic	mange	three	months	later.	The	course	and	clinical	manifestation	of	
the	disease	is	related	to	the	underlying	immune	status	of	the	individual	(1).	Consequently,	there	is	a	low	likelihood	
that	Sarcoptes	scabei	could	be	translocated	to	the	UK	in	the	population	of	asymptomatic	Trial	Lynx,	and	
reactivated	to	result	in	clinical	disease	as	a	result	of	stress	induced	immunosuppression.	Given	the	prolonged	
incubation	period	and	potential	for	environmental	contamination	from	untreated,	diseased	Lynx,	the	overall	
likelihood	of	release	is	moderate.	
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Exposure	Assessment	 As	Sarcoptic	scabei	is	present	in	both	the	source	and	release	environments,	the	potential	exists	for	density	
dependent	transmission	from	infected	foxes	and	other	prey	species	in	the	destination	environment	to	the	Lynx	
population	and	vice-versa.	Sarcoptic	mange	can	be	acquired	through	direct	contact	with	infected	individuals	or	
though	indirect	contact	with	the	environment	(1).	As	Sarcoptic	mange	in	red	foxes	is	endemic	at	a	low	prevalence	
level	in	the	Kielder	area	(5),	Lynx	could	acquire	sarcoptic	mange	by	preying	on	diseased	foxes.	Furthermore,	
despite	the	solitary	nature	of	Lynx,	intraspecific	transmission	of	Sarcoptes	scabei	could	occur	between	adult	
females	and	dependent	kittens	or	between	adult	males	and	females	as	a	result	of	mating.		
	
The	potential	for	zoonotic	infections	is	low	but	scientists	and	field	veterinarians	could	become	infected	as	a	result	
of	handling	anaesthetized	symptomatic	Lynx	or	infected	fomites	during	capture	and	health	screening	procedures.	
Overall	the	risk	of	exposure	from	infected	founder	Lynx	is	low,	but	the	risk	of	transmission	to	Lynx	from	infected	
wildlife	at	the	destination	environment	is	moderate.	
Consequence	
Assessment	
Epizootics	of	sarcoptic	mange	have	not	been	demonstrated	to	have	long-term	population	level	effects	in	stable	
free-ranging	Lynx	populations	(8,	1).	However,	mortality	related	to	infectious	disease	can	threaten	the	viability	of	
small	translocated	Lynx	populations	in	the	context	of	additional	sources	of	anthropogenic	mortality	such	as	
poaching	(7).		
	
As	Sarcoptic	mange	is	endemic	at	a	low	prevalence	level	in	Kielder	Forest	(5),	the	small	number	of	translocated	
Lynx	pose	no	significant	threat	in	terms	of	disease	transmission	to	wildlife,	livestock	or	domestic	pets	in	the	
destination	environment.	However,	the	interspecific	disease	transmission	from	infected	foxes	to	Lynx	and	the	
subsequent	intraspecific	transmission	within	the	population	of	Trial	Animals	could	result	in	significant	morbidity	
and	mortality,	reducing	reproductive	potential	and	recruitment.	In	addition	to	the	biological	impacts	of	disease,	
the	loss	of	a	small	number	of	adult	breeding	Lynx,	could	threaten	the	viability	of	the	reintroduction	programme	
with	far	reaching	economic	consequences	such	as	an	increased	requirement	for	disease	monitoring	and	
management.	
	
Despite	the	potential	for	severe	biological	and	economic	consequences	of	sarcoptic	mange	in	a	population	of	
translocated	Lynx,	foxes	only	form	a	small	part	of	the	diet	of	Lynx	and	the	incidence	of	Sarcoptic	mange	in	foxes	in	
Kielder	is	low.	Therefore,	the	overall	likelihood	of	consequences	as	a	result	of	Sarcoptes	scabei	is	moderate.	
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Overall	Risk	
Estimation	
Moderate	
Risk	Management	 To	mitigate	the	risk	of	Sarcoptes	scabei,	all	founder	individuals	will	be	tested	for	the	ectoparasite	(Sarcoptes	
Antibody	ELISA	and	skin	scrapes)	prior	to	leaving	the	source	environment.	Following	testing,	all	individuals	will	be	
treated	with	ivermectin	injectable	solution	which	is	the	treatment	of	choice	for	sarcoptic	mange.		
	
Surveillance	of	Lynx	in	the	soft	release	enclosure	and	free-ranging	Lynx	and	red	foxes	in	the	destination	
environment,	will	determine	the	spatial	and	temporal	prevalence	of	sarcoptic	mange	in	those	species.	The	
identification	of	individual	diseased	Lynx	will	enable	the	capture,	treatment	and	rehabilitation	of	those	individuals.		
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Mycobacterium	bovis	 Hazard	categories:	Destination	
Justification	for	Hazard	Status	 Mycobacterium	bovis	(M.	bovis)	is	a	Gram	positive,	acid-fast	bacterium	in	the	Mycobacterium	tuberculosis	
complex	of	the	family	Mycobacteriaceae.	It	has	a	global	distribution,	a	wide	host	range,	and	can	persist	for	
several	months	in	the	environment	(1).	Infection	is	acquired	by	inhalation,	ingestion	or	via	breaks	in	the	
skin,	and	bacilli	can	be	shed	in	respiratory	secretions,	faeces,	urine,	pus,	milk,	vaginal	secretions	and	semen	
(1	and	2).	M.	bovis	is	the	cause	of	bovine	tuberculosis	(bTB),	and	as	such	is	a	major	cause	of	economic	loss	
worldwide.	Eradication	of	bTB	in	many	countries	has	been	hindered	by	the	fact	that	M.	bovis	persists	
within	wildlife	reservoir	hosts	–	in	the	UK	the	badger	(Meles	meles)	is	widely	believed	to	be	the	primary	
reservoir	(or	maintenance)	host.	M.	bovis	has	been	notifiable	in	the	UK	since	2006	(3).	
Although	reports	of	TB	in	wild	carnivores	are	rare	(4),	the	Iberian	lynx	(Lynx	pardinus)	is	known	to	be	
susceptible	to	M.	bovis	infection	(5).	Infection	has	been	reported	in	two	free-living	(4	and	6)	and	two	
captive	Iberian	lynx	(7).	Although	there	are	no	reports	of	M.	bovis	infection	in	free-living	Eurasian	Lynx	
(Lynx	lynx),	an	outbreak	of	tuberculosis	(TB)	due	to	M.	bovis	that	affected	two	captive	Lynx	has	been	
reported	(8).		
Sweden	is	currently	classified	as	Officially	TB	Free	(OTF),	a	recognition	of	the	low	and	stable	incidence	of	
bTB	in	Swedish	herds	(15).	Furthermore,	there	are	no	reports	of	M.	bovis	in	free-living	Swedish	Lynx	(9,	10	
and	11).	M.	bovis	therefore	constitutes	a	destination	hazard,	and	a	release	assessment	is	not	required	
Risk	Assessment	 	
Exposure	Assessment	 Although	Scotland	has	been	OTF	since	September	2009,	England	and	Wales	have	never	achieved	the	same	
status.	In	the	UK,	bTB	is	concentrated	in	the	west	and	south-west	of	England,	as	well	as	in	Wales	(3).	In	low	
risk	areas	(the	north,	east	and	south-east	of	England)	the	incidence	of	bTB	is	very	low	and	stable,	and	the	
majority	of	breakdowns	can	be	linked	to	movements	of	undetected	infected	cattle	from	other	areas	of	the	
UK	(12).	Scotland’s	herd	incidence	is	very	low	and	stable	and	is	also	largely	driven	by	introductions	of	
infected	cattle	(12).	The	current	bTB	surveillance	and	control	scheme	has	been	successful	at	preventing	the	
establishment	of	disease	in	many	counties	in	the	north	and	east	of	England,	areas	that	are	thought	to	not	
yet	have	a	significant	reservoir	of	infection	in	wildlife	(13).	There	has	never	been	a	systematic	approach	to	
bTB	surveillance	in	non-bovine	species	in	the	UK,	however,	and	the	disease	is	believed	to	be	spreading	
north	and	east,	so	there	is	no	room	for	complacency	(3).		
	 37	
While	badgers	are	known	to	be	the	primary	maintenance	host	for	M.	bovis	in	the	UK	(1)	several	species	of	
deer	(as	well	as	foxes,	hares	and	rodents)	have	been	identified	as	spill-over	hosts	(1).	Deer	are	highly	
susceptible	to	M.	bovis	(2),	and	are	believed	to	be	able	to	act	as	maintenance	hosts	in	certain	situations	
(such	as	when	population	densities	are	very	high)	(3).	Disease	in	deer	tends	to	be	subacute	or	chronic	in	
nature	(1),	and	a	respiratory	route	of	infection	seems	most	important	(2).	MAFF	investigations	that	ran	
from	the	1970s	to	the	1990s	found	a	0.9%	prevalence	of	M.	bovis	in	UK	roe	deer	(Capreolus	capreolus)	(2).	
MAFF’s	collection	of	carcases	was	targeted	around	areas	of	high	TB	incidence	in	cattle,	so	does	not	
represent	disease	prevalence	across	all	UK	wildlife	populations	–	disease	prevalence	in	areas	of	low	bTB	
incidence	may	be	lower	still.		
Lynx	will	target	roe	deer	in	poor	condition,	because	they	are	easier	to	catch	(5)	and	so	exposure	to	M.	bovis	
through	their	primary	prey	species	remains	possible,	even	if	disease	prevalence	in	roe	deer	is	low.		
Disease	exposure	through	predation	on	other	species	appears	relatively	unlikely.	There	are	no	published	
cases	of	M.	bovis	infection	in	wild	rabbits	(Oryctolagus	cuniculus),	European	hares	(Lepus	europaeus)	or	
mountain	hares	(Lepus	timidus)	in	the	UK	(2).	A	very	low	to	zero	M.	bovis	prevalence	in	voles,	mice,	shrews,	
rats	and	squirrels	has	also	been	reported	(2).	Furthermore,	there	are	no	references	to	confirmed	M.	bovis	
infections	in	feral	goats	or	feral	wild	boar	(Sus	scrofus)	within	the	UK	–	despite	the	prevalence	of	infection	
in	wild	boar	populations	elsewhere	in	Europe	(2).	TB	in	sheep	is	uncommon	(3).	MAFF	reported	a	1.2%	
prevalence	of	TB	in	red	foxes	(Vulpes	vulpes)	(2),	so	exposure	to	M.	bovis	through	predation	on	foxes	
appears	possible.	Fox	carcasses	were	only	collected	from	areas	of	endemic	bTB,	however	–	suggesting	that	
the	prevalence	in	the	Study	Area	may	be	lower	(2).		
It	has	been	suggested	that	M.	bovis	spreads	from	infected	badgers	to	domestic	cats	following	interspecific	
aggression	(14),	and	it	is	possible	that	Lynx	could	acquire	M.	bovis	infection	in	the	same	way.	Although	cats	
(and	carnivores	in	general)	usually	acquire	M.	bovis	infection	through	the	ingestion	of	infected	food	(4)	
they	can	also	become	infected	by	the	respiratory	route,	or	percutaneously	via	bites	and	scratches	(1).	A	
review	of	mycobacterial	infections	in	domestic	cats	in	the	UK	found	M.	bovis,	M.	microti	and	M.	avium	to	
have	a	discrete,	almost	entirely	non-overlapping	geographical	distribution	(14).	M.	bovis	infections	were	
concentrated	in	areas	of	endemic	bTB.	There	were	no	M.	bovis	infections	reported	in	northern	England	or	
southern	Scotland	–	this	area	being	dominated	by	M.	microti	infections.	It	may	well	be	that	mycobacterial	
infections	in	Trial	Animals	would	tend	to	follow	a	similar	pattern.		
Exposure	risk:	low	
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Consequence	Assessment	 Although	individual	Trial	Animals	are	likely	to	be	at	some	risk	of	exposure	to	M.	bovis,	intra-specific	disease	
transmission	seems	quite	unlikely,	given	the	Lynx’s	solitary	nature	(4).	Furthermore,	because	only	six	Trial	
Animals	will	be	released,	the	potential	for	inter-specific	disease	spread	through	environmental	
contamination	is	low.		
Because	cats	are	only	spill-over	(or	even	dead-end)	hosts,	however,	there	is	no	evolutionary	pressure	on	
M.	bovis	to	adapt	to	lower	virulence	when	infecting	them	(15)	(see	Footnotes	8	and	9).	M.	bovis	is	
therefore	capable	of	causing	severe	disease	in	felids	and	it	has	been	suggested	that	M.	bovis	could	be	
highly	detrimental	to	small	and	fragmented	populations	of	Iberian	lynx	(4).	A	small	population	of	Trial	
Animals	could	also	be	vulnerable.		
Consequence	risk:	moderate	
Overall	Risk	Estimation	 Low	
Risk	Management	 Because	the	overall	risk	posed	by	M.	bovis	is	low,	few	mitigation	measures	will	be	required.	When	
translocated	Lynx	or	their	offspring	die,	however,	they	will	receive	a	prompt	and	thorough	post	mortem	
examination.	Suspicious	lesions	and	enlarged	lymph	nodes	will	be	biopsied.	The	biopsies	will	be	sectioned	–	
one	sample	will	be	sent	for	histology	and	the	other	frozen	pending	the	histology	result.	If	the	histology	
results	are	suggestive	of	M.	bovis	infection	the	frozen	sample	will	be	required	for	further	clarification	of	
disease	status.		
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Francisella	tularensis	
(Type	B)	
Hazard	categories:	Source	and	Zoonotic	
Justification	for	
Hazard	Status	
Francisella	tularensis	is	a	bacterial	pathogen	which	causes	tularaemia,	a	disease	with	potentially	severe	clinical	
symptoms	(1).	It	is	a	facultative	intracellular	parasite	(2)	and	one	of	only	two	species	in	the	Francisellaceae	family	
of	bacteria	(3).	It	has	been	reported	in	250	animal	species	(4)	and	is	associated	with	typical	Lynx	prey	species	such	
as	rodents	and	hares	(1)	as	well	as	red	fox	and	wild	boar	(5).	It	has	been	suggested	that	the	Lynx	could	be	
susceptible	to	infection	(6),	although	there	have	been	no	reported	cases.	Tularaemia	is	a	zoonotic	disease	with	the	
potential	to	cause	epidemics,	and	is	notifiable	at	the	international	level	(5).	F.	tularensis	is	not	transmitted	from	
human	to	human,	however,	so	outbreaks	are	usually	self-limiting	(3).	Because	the	UK	is	free	of	F.	tularensis	(1)	it	is	
a	source	hazard	of	some	concern	(see	Footnotes	1	and	2).	Tularaemia	is	a	disease	of	complex	epidemiology	that	is	
challenging	to	understand	and	therefore	difficult	to	control	(5).	Many	aspects	of	the	disease	remain	poorly	
understood,	and	knowledge	of	reservoir	hosts	is	incomplete	(5).		
Scandinavia	is	a	hotspot	for	tularaemia	in	humans,	and	Sweden	has	the	second	highest	average	incidence	rate	in	
Europe.	There	are	areas	of	both	endemic	and	emergent	disease	within	the	country	(5)	(see	Footnotes	3	and	4).		
Lynx	frequently	prey	upon	rodents	and	lagomorphs,	and	therefore	could	become	infected	with	F.	tularensis	(6)	(see	
Footnote	5).	A	study	of	91	Swedish	Lynx	carcasses	between	1993	and	1999,	however,	found	no	evidence	of	
antibodies	to	the	organism	(6)	(see	Footnote	6).	Antibodies	to	F.	tularensis	have	been	found	in	Bobcat	(Lynx	rufus)	
and	Canada	Lynx	(Lynx	canadiensis)	and	tularaemia	has	been	occasionally	reported	in	the	domestic	cat	(Felis	catus)	
(9	and	12).	Felids	are	generally	considered	to	be	resistant	to	the	disease	(13).		
Risk	Assessment	 	
Release	Assessment	 F.	tularensis	is	widely	believed	to	be	associated	with	both	rodents	and	lagomorphs	(1)	(see	Footnotes	7	and	8).	It	is	
possible	that	rodents	and	lagomorphs	are	responsible	for	the	spread	of	F.	tularensis	within	the	environment	(3	and	
16),	and	that	they	constitute	important	vectors	of	disease.	An	F.	tularensis	prevalence	of	2.1%	has	been	
demonstrated	in	rodents	from	south	central	Sweden	(4).	Rodents	pose	a	low	to	moderate	risk	of	associated	
invasion	(by	stowing	away	in	transport	modules).		
There	have	been	no	reports	of	either	the	detection	of	F.	tularensis	or	of	clinical	tularaemia	in	the	Lynx,	and	despite	
the	fact	that	Lynx	prey	upon	various	species	known	to	be	susceptible	to	tularaemia,	the	risk	of	Trial	Animals	
carrying	the	organism	appears	to	be	low.		
Few	pathogens	show	the	adaptability	of	F.	tularensis	to	such	a	wide	array	of	arthropod	vectors	(17).	Strong	
evidence	suggests	that	adult	ticks	are	significant	biological	vectors	of	F.	tularensis	(5)	and	may	also	be	significant	
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reservoirs	of	infection	(17	and	18)	(see	Footnote	9).	The	prevalence	of	F.	tularensis	in	European	tick	populations	is	
generally	between	0	and	3%,	but	can	be	higher	(20).	The	tick’s	relatively	long	life	span	(c.	2	years)	permits	it	to	
transmit	infection	several	times	over	relatively	long	periods	of	time	(17).		
Transmission	of	the	organism	by	mosquitoes	has	also	been	demonstrated	(3)	(see	Footnote	10).	Mosquitoes	are	
believed	to	be	mechanical	rather	than	biological	vectors	of	disease,	transmitting	the	organism	transiently	on	
contaminated	mouthparts	via	interrupted	feeding	(17	and	18).	It	has	been	suggested	that	mosquitoes	play	a	
greater	role	in	the	epidemiology	of	tularaemia	in	northern	Europe,	where	they	are	relatively	abundant	and	ticks	
relatively	rare	(22).	Clinical	experience	and	epidemiological	data	support	the	role	of	mosquitoes	as	vectors	of	F.	
tularensis	in	Sweden	(23	and	24)	(see	Footnote	11).		
Tabanid	flies	have	also	been	associated	with	tularaemia	outbreaks	(28)	and	several	species	have	been	shown	to	
carry	F.	tularensis	(17).	They	are	believed	to	act	as	mechanical	rather	than	biological	vectors,	transmitting	infection	
transiently	via	contaminated	mouthparts	during	interrupted	feeding	(see	Footnote	12).		
F.	tularensis	has	been	found	in	fleas	–	but	their	role	in	the	epidemiology	of	tularaemia	is	currently	unclear	(13).		
Swedish	Lynx	are	undoubtedly	affected	by	various	arthropod	species	suspected	of	involvement	in	the	epidemiology	
of	tularaemia,	but	the	risk	of	Lynx	becoming	infected	as	a	result	appears	to	be	low.	Arthropods	such	as	ticks,	
tabanids,	mosquitoes	and	fleas	(upon	translocated	Lynx	or	in	the	transport	module)	all	pose	a	moderate	to	high	
associated	invasion	risk	in	the	absence	of	risk	mitigation,	however.		
The	incidence	of	human	tularaemia	across	Europe	varies	by	season	–	there	are	more	cases	in	summer	and	autumn	
(5	–	Figure	2).	Capturing	the	Trial	Animals	during	these	months	is	likely	to	increase	the	risk	of	releasing	F.	tularensis	
into	the	Study	Area.	Taking	Trial	Animals	from	a	hotspot	of	endemic	disease	(or	a	region	currently	suffering	from	an	
epidemic)	would	also	increase	the	risk.		
Overall	risk	of	release	(without	risk	management):	MODERATE.	
Exposure	Assessment	 Infected	lynx	could	become	parasitized	by	blood	feeding	arthropods	vectors	(ticks,	mosquitoes	and	tabanids)	
within	the	Study	Area.	They	could	also	potentially	excrete	F.	tularensis	in	urine	or	faeces	(this	hasn’t	been	reported	
in	cats,	but	can’t	be	ruled	out).	Risk	of	exposure	via	infected	Lynx:	moderate.	
Infected	stowaway	rodents	could	excrete	F.	tularensis	in	urine	(14)	or	faeces	(15).	Aquatic	or	semi-aquatic	rodents	
could	infect	water	courses	(see	Footnote	13).	Infected	rodents	could	become	parasitized	by	blood	feeding	
arthropod	vectors	(ticks,	mosquitoes	and	tabanids).	They	could	also	fall	prey	to	carnivores	such	as	foxes,	domestic	
cats	and	Lynx.	Rodents	could	also	spread	infection	by	fighting	with	conspecifics.	Risk	of	exposure	via	infected	
rodents:	high.	
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Infected	ticks	can	transmit	infection	during	a	blood	meal.	They	are	biological	vectors	to	which	F.	tularensis	is	well	
adapted.	The	prevalence	of	the	organism	in	Swedish	ticks	can	be	high	and	transstadial	transmission	occurs	(17).	
Lynx	could	play	host	to	tick	larvae	and/or	nymphs,	which	could	go	on	to	parasitize	a	variety	of	animal	species	
(including	smaller	species	such	as	rodents)	as	adult	ticks.	Risk	of	exposure	via	ticks:	high.	
Infected	mosquitoes	can	transmit	infection	mechanically	during	interrupted	feeding	(21),	potentially	infecting	
many	individuals.	Although	mosquitoes	can	feed	repeatedly,	their	lifespan	is	short	(typically	a	few	weeks).	
Transovarial	transmission	hasn’t	been	shown	(so	the	infection	dies	with	the	mosquito)	(17).	Risk	of	exposure	via	
infected	mosquitoes:	moderate.	
Infected	tabanids	are	mechanical	vectors	capable	of	causing	tularaemia	outbreaks	via	interrupted	feeding	(28).	
They	have	been	shown,	however,	to	be	capable	of	transmitting	disease	for	only	four	days	after	initial	infection	(29).	
Risk	of	exposure	via	infected	tabanids:	moderate.	
Fleas	can	carry	F.	tularensis	infection	(13)	and	Lynx	may	play	host	to	fleas.	Although	it	seems	unlikely,	we	can’t	
exclude	the	possibility	of	fleas	spreading	the	organism	to	the	Study	Area.			
A	comprehensive	exposure	assessment	should	also	consider	the	risk	of	exposure	to	humans.	Zoonotic	transmission	
could	occur	through	aerosols,	ingestion	of	contaminated	food/water	and	through	direct	contact	with	infected	pets,	
livestock,	wildlife	and	arthropods.		Risk	of	human	exposure:	moderate.		
Overall	exposure	risk:	MODERATE.	
Consequence	
Assessment	
If	susceptible	animals	or	humans	in	the	Study	Area	are	exposed	to	F.	tularensis	the	likelihood	of	consequences	is	
high,	because	the	organism	is	highly	infectious.	F.	tularensis	is	notifiable	to	the	OIE	when	first	diagnosed	in	animals,	
and	notifiable	to	Public	Health	England	if	diagnosed	in	humans.	Doctors	are	likely	to	be	slow	to	diagnose	the	
condition,	due	to	lack	of	familiarity	and	a	long	list	of	differentials.	A	tularaemia	outbreak	in	the	UK	would	
necessitate	a	huge	mobilisation	of	resources	and	the	involvement	of	a	wide	variety	of	personnel	(vets,	biologists,	
epidemiologists,	government	agency	staff	etc).	A	“runaway”	epidemic	would	not	occur,	however,	because	human	
to	human	transmission	of	F.	tularensis	does	not	occur	(3	and	1).	It	also	seems	very	unlikely	that	a	significant	
outbreak	would	occur	in	the	absence	of	a	substantial	pre-existing	environmental	reservoir	of	infection.		
Overall	consequence	severity:	MODERATE.	
Risk	Estimation	 Given	a	moderate	risk	of	release	and	a	moderate	risk	of	exposure,	we	can	conclude	that	the	overall	likelihood	of	
entry	and	exposure	is	moderate.	The	consequences	of	entry	and	exposure	are	also	moderate.	Use	of	the	risk	
estimation	matrix	suggests	that	the	overall	risk	posed	by	F.	tularensis	(without	risk	management)	is	MODERATE.		
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Risk	Management	 We	will	avoid	trapping	lynx	in	areas	where	tularaemia	is	endemic	(e.g.	Norbotten,	Ljusdal)	or	emergent	(e.g.	
Ӧrebro),	and	we	will	consider	the	possibility	of	trapping	Lynx	in	areas	where	the	Flood	Water	Mosquito	(Aedes	
sticticus)	doesn’t	occur	(i.e.	areas	of	the	north	where	tularaemia	isn’t	endemic).	We	will,	if	possible,	avoid	trapping	
Lynx	during	seasons	of	high	tularaemia	incidence	(the	summer	and	autumn)	–	although	this	decision	will	also	be	
affected	by	other	factors	related	to	Lynx	biology	and	to	logistics.	It	is	also	worth	noting	that	Swedish	Lynx	are	
unlikely	to	have	encountered	the	organism,	whatever	time	of	year	they	are	trapped.		
We	will	liaise	with	local	public	health	and	veterinary	health	authorities	in	Sweden,	so	that	we	are	fully	aware	of	
recent	local	tularaemia	outbreaks	in	either	humans	or	animals.	All	captured	Lynx	will	be	anaesthetised	and	
carefully	checked	for	symptoms	of	tularaemia	(as	per	9	and	12).	All	Lynx	will	be	tested	for	antibodies	to	F.	
tularensis	(see	Footnotes	14	and	15).	We	also	hope	to	be	able	to	perform	PCR	testing	(on	blood)	to	look	for	the	
organism	itself.	We	will	test	a	proportion	of	the	ticks	that	we	find	on	captured	Lynx	for	F.	tularensis.	All	
translocated	Lynx	are	to	be	treated	for	ticks	with	fipronil	(which	will	also	kill	fleas).	We	will	take	measures	to	ensure	
that	no	associated	invasion	(of	ticks,	mosquitoes,	tabanids,	fleas	or	rodents)	occurs.	Any	Lynx	fatalities	occurring	
after	translocation	will	receive	a	full	and	prompt	post-mortem	examination	(including	fluorescent	antibody	testing	
of	tissue	samples,	where	appropriate).		
The	implementation	of	these	mitigation	measures	would	reduce	the	risk	of	release	and	exposure	in	the	Study	Area	
to	very	low	levels.	Use	of	the	risk	estimation	matrix	suggests	that	the	overall	post-mitigation	risk	posed	by	
Francisella	tularensis	is	LOW.		
Footnotes	 1. There	are	four	subspecies	of	F.	tularensis,	but	the	only	subspecies	found	in	Europe	is	F.	tularensis	
holoarctica	–	also	known	as	F.	tularensis	type	B.	It	causes	a	milder	disease	than	F.	tularensis	type	A	(7)	and	is	
generally	non-lethal	in	humans	(1).	
2. Because	doctors	in	the	UK	are	generally	unfamiliar	with	the	condition,	and	because	the	list	of	differentials	is	
long	(3),	diagnosis	of	tularaemia	in	human	patients	in	the	event	of	an	outbreak	in	the	UK	is	unlikely	to	be	
swift.		
3. Sweden	was	responsible	for	25%	of	all	reported	European	tularaemia	cases	between	1992	and	2012	(5).	
4. Some	authors	have	stated	that	F.	tularensis	is	only	endemic	in	the	north	of	the	country	(1).	Between	1992	
and	1998,	80%	of	reported	human	tularaemia	cases	in	Sweden	occurred	in	the	north	of	the	country	(8).	In	
Norrbotten	(in	the	far	north	of	the	country)	in	2012	there	were	82	cases	per	100,000	people	(5).	However	
the	pattern	is	not	static	–	in	the	2000s	the	disease	emerged	in	areas	of	central	Sweden	too	(4).		
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5. Cats	are	believed	to	become	infected	by	F.	tularensis	via	1)	direct	contact	with	or	ingestion	of	infected	
animal	tissue,	2)	ingestion	of	contaminated	water,	3)	arthropod	bites	or	4)	inhalation	of	aerosols	(9).	
6. This	may	have	been	because	most	of	the	Lynx	carcasses	were	tested	during	the	winter,	when	tularaemia	in	
Scandinavian	hare	populations	is	at	a	low	level	(10).	However	because	F.	tularensis	antibody	titres	in	Lynx	
are	likely	to	persist	for	several	years	(11),	it	is	more	likely	that	the	Lynx	had	genuinely	never	been	exposed	
to	the	organism.	
7. Voles,	mice,	lemmings	and	hares	are	considered	to	be	highly	susceptible	to	infection	(3).	Infected	voles	have	
been	shown	to	shed	the	organism	via	both	urine	(14)	and	faeces	(15),	and	outbreaks	of	tularaemia	in	
humans	often	follow	outbreaks	in	rodents	(3).	The	shedding	of	the	organism	by	chronically	infected	hares	
has	not	been	shown,	but	is	certainly	possible	(1).	
8. There	is	no	evidence,	however,	that	mammals	constitute	a	major	reservoir	of	infection	(3).	Although	highly	
susceptible	to	infection,	rodents	and	lagomorphs	do	not	seem	capable	of	harbouring	the	bacteria	between	
outbreaks	(1).	This	may	be	because	they	rarely	survive	the	infection	(1)	and	therefore	represent	accidental	
rather	than	reservoir	hosts	of	the	bacterium	(7).	
9. F.	tularensis	is	known	to	disseminate	to	and	replicate	within	the	tick’s	salivary	glands,	thus	entering	the	
saliva	(19).	They	are	known	to	be	consequently	capable	of	transmitting	an	infection	during	a	blood	meal	
(19)	and	transstadial	transmission	is	known	to	occur	(17).	Transovarial	transmission	has	not	been	
demonstrated,	however	(17).		
10. It	has	been	demonstrated	that	multiple	mosquito	species	(including	Aedes	species)	can	transmit	disease	to	
mice	(21).	
11. A	high	prevalence	of	the	organism	has	been	demonstrated	in	Swedish	mosquitoes	(25)	and	a	correlation	
between	mosquito	abundance	and	human	tularaemia	cases	in	forested	parts	of	the	country	has	been	
reported	(26).	Aedes	sticticus	(the	Flood	Water	Mosquito)	and	Aedes	cinereus	are	the	species	of	greatest	
concern	in	terms	of	the	spread	of	tularaemia	within	Sweden	(27).	A.	cinereus	is	found	across	the	whole	
country,	whereas	A.	sticticus	is	confined	to	the	south	(27).	The	distribution	of	tularaemia	in	eastern	Europe	
and	Sweden	is	related	to	natural	water	(1)	and	it	has	been	suggested	that	mosquitoes	may	be	responsible	
for	the	spread	of	F.	tularensis	from	a	water	reservoir	to	humans	(5).	The	larvae	of	Flood	Water	Mosquitoes	
(A.	sticticus)	prey	on	aquatic	protozoa,	and	may	well	be	exposed	to	F.	tularensis	this	way	(4).		
12. The	organism	is	thought	to	neither	multiply	nor	survive	long	term	within	tabanids	(17).	The	deer	fly	
(Chrysops	discalis)	is	able	to	transmit	F.	tularensis	to	animals	for	only	four	days	following	infection	(29).		
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13. F.	tularensis	is	thought	to	be	able	to	survive	for	long	periods	in	aquatic	protozoa,	which	could	in	turn	lead	to	
infection	becoming	acquired	by	mosquito	larvae.	The	organism	is	known	to	be	transmitted	transstadially	in	
mosquitoes,	so	infected	larvae	could	soon	become	infected	adult	mosquitoes	with	the	ability	to	act	as	
mechanical	vectors	of	disease.		
14. It	should	be	noted	that	studies	have	found	only	1	of	3	domestic	cats	with	tularaemia	to	be	seropositive	(12).		
15. Ideally	paired	sera	will	be	taken	in	order	to	identify	a	rising	antibody	titre	that	could	reflect	recent	exposure	
to	F.	tularensis	or	the	current	incubation	of	disease.	
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F)	Generic	Ticks	 Hazard	Categories	(Source/Destination/Zoonoses)	
	 The	haematophagous,	parasitic	activities	of	ticks	are	generally	associated	with	low	levels	of	morbidity	in	Lynx.	
However,	the	hazard	status	of	ticks	relates	to	their	role	as	important	vectors	in	the	transmission	of	disease	and	the	
existence	of	novel	species	in	the	source	and	destination	environments.	In	Northern	Europe	the	majority	of	tick	
species	belong	to	the	family	Ixodidae	with	a	limited	number	belonging	to	the	family	Argasidae	(1).	Ixodes	ricinus,	the	
sheep	tick,	is	the	most	abundant	and	widely	distributed	hard	tick	species	in	Sweden	and	in	the	UK	(1).		
	
Despite	significant	overlap	in	the	tick	fauna	of	the	UK	and	Sweden,	the	British	Isles	are	more	species	rich	due	to	a	
conducive	climate	and	more	southerly	latitude	(1).	Most	species	in	the	family	ixodidae	occur	in	both	the	source	and	
destination	environment	although	some	species	such	as	Dermacentor	reticulatus	and	Hyalomma	marginatum	are	
only	present	in	the	UK	(2,	1).	Climate	change	scenarios	are	predicted	to	alter	the	abundance	and	distribution	of	tick	
species	in	Northern	Europe,	due	to	increased	winter	warming	and	associated	tick	survival	(3).	Furthermore,	the	
movement	of	livestock	and	domestic	pets	could	enable	southern	European	species	to	extend	their	northern	range	
and	colonise	countries	such	as	Great	Britain	(3).	Therefore,	there	is	a	potential	risk	that	the	translocation	of	Lynx	to	a	
destination	environment	at	a	more	southerly	latitude	could	expose	them	to	novel	tick	species	and	increased	tick	
densities.		
	
Ixodid	ticks	constitute	a	vector	for	the	transmission	of	many	diseases	including	Anaplasma,	Babesia,	Borrelia	and	
Flavivirrus	species.	However,	the	majority	of	tick	borne	diseases	occur	as	the	same	subspecies	in	the	source	and	
destination	environments	and	are	not	novel	to	the	Lynx.	Only	tick-borne	encephalitis	virus	and	tularaemia	constitute	
zoonotic	source	hazards	and	comprehensive	risk	assessments	relating	to	these	diseases	can	be	found	in	Appendix	1	
of	this	report.	Given	the	mitigation	measures	to	avoid	the	entry	of	novel	tick	species	and	associated	diseases	from	
the	source	environment,	the	overall	risk	to	Lynx	from	ticks	in	the	destination	environment	is	low.	Despite	the	
likelihood	of	exposing	some	founder	Lynx	from	more	northerly	parts	of	Sweden	to	higher	tick	densities	in	the	
destination	environment,	the	Lynx	will	only	constitute	an	accidental	host	for	tick-borne	diseases	in	the	UK.	
Therefore,	it	is	unlikely	that	the	Lynx	will	be	impacted	at	a	population	level	by	tick-borne	diseases	in	the	UK	and	
furthermore	will	not	act	as	a	reservoir	for	the	transmission	of	zoonotic	tick-borne	infections	in	the	release	
environment	such	as	louping	ill.	
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Appendix	2.		
Individual	Disease	Risk	Assessments:	Welfare	Hazards	
	
	
A)	Illegal	Persecution	
(Shooting/Trapping	
/Poisoning)	
Hazard	Categories	(Destination/Population)	
Justification	for	Hazard	
Status	
Non-infectious	causes	of	mortality	such	as	illegal	shooting,	trapping	or	poisoning	constitute	the	greatest	threat	to	
Lynx	populations	across	Europe	(1).	In	contrast	the	overall	prevalence	of	Infections	in	Lynx	is	low	due	to	their	solitary	
nature,	and	epizootics	of	disease	are	rarely	reported	(2).		
	
Between	1994	and	2002	the	cause	of	mortality	was	documented	for	245	radio-collared	Lynx	at	five	study	sites	in	
Sweden	and	Norway	(3).	Poaching	accounted	for	46%	of	fatalities	in	adult	Lynx	due	to	conflict	with	reindeer	(Rangifer	
tarandus)	herders	in	Northern	Scandinavia	and	roe	deer	(Capreolus	capreolus)	hunters	in	Southern	regions	(3).	A	
study	conducted	between	1987	and	1999	in	the	Swiss	Alps	and	Jura	mountains,	established	that	72%	of	deceased	
Lynx	(57/72)	submitted	to	the	Institute	of	Animal	Pathology,	Institute	of	Bern,	had	died	of	anthropogenic	causes	(4).	
Of	those,	15	had	died	in	road	traffic	accidents,	8	had	been	poached	and	two	had	died	as	a	result	being	trapped.	
Death	due	to	infectious	disease	only	accounted	for	18%	(13/72)	of	the	overall	mortality	(4).		
	
Anthropogenic	mortality	does	not	generally	threaten	the	viability	of	free-ranging	autochthonous	Lynx	populations,	
however	illegal	persecution	is	often	additive	to	other	forms	of	mortality	such	as	infectious	disease	(3),	and	could	
have	population	level	impacts	on	a	small	reintroduced	Lynx	population	in	the	UK.		
Risk	Assessment	
Exposure	Assessment	 Data	sets	relating	to	wildlife	crime	in	the	UK	are	held	by	both	government	and	non-government	agencies.	The	annual	
Birdcrime	report	published	by	the	The	Royal	Society	for	the	Protection	of	Birds	(RSPB)	is	the	most	comprehensive	
source	of	raptor	persecution	incident	data	for	British	birds	in	space	and	time	(5).	Extrapolating	the	risk	to	Lynx	from	
the	Birdcrime	report	is	justified	on	the	basis	that	both	species	could	be	perceived	as	threats	to	the	interests	of	rural	
stakeholders.	Data	from	the	Birdcrime	(2014)	report	document	a	decrease	in	the	reported	incidence	of	‘Shooting	
and	destruction	of	birds	of	prey’	from	284	in	2009	to	179	in	2014.	Furthermore,	similar	reductions	were	reported	for	
‘Poisoning	 and	 use	 of	 poison	 baits’	 from	 158	 to	 72	 in	 2009	 and	 2014	 respectively	 (5).	 Since	 2012	 the	 Scottish	
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Government	Environment	and	Forestry	Directorate	has	published	annual	reports	on	wildlife	crime	in	Scotland	(6).	
The	2015	report	records	a	decrease	of	20%	in	wildlife	crime	reported	to	Police	Scotland	from	355	incidents	in	2010-
11	to	284	in	2014-15	(6).			
	
The	ongoing	and	illegal	use	of	firearms	and	poisons	could	represent	a	threat	to	the	Trial	Animals		in	the	UK.	In	contrast	
to	shooting	and	trapping,	which	requires	a	sustained	effort	by	criminals,	poisoning	can	have	a	population	level	impact	
with	only	minimal	effort	and	poison	baits	continue	to	be	lethal	over	a	period	of	days	or	weeks	without	further	effort	
by	 the	poisoner.	Lynx	could	be	exposed	to	 illegal	poisons	such	as	carbofuran	as	 they	have	been	documented	to	
consume	carrion	if	live	prey	is	scarce	through	the	winter	months	(7).	
	
Many	 studies	 have	 analyzed	 the	 spatial	 distribution	 of	 illegal	 persecution	 incidents	 and	 have	 documented	 an	
association	with	open	moorland	areas	managed	for	high	value	driven	red	grouse	shooting	(5).	The	reintroduced	Lynx	
are	unlikely	 to	use	open	moorland	areas	where	 they	might	encounter	poison	baits	and	 the	Kielder	 forest	 is	not	
associated	with	high	value	field	sports.	
	
Overall	the	likelihood	of	exposure	to	illegal	persecution	is	moderate	on	the	basis	of	reductions	in	the	incidence	of	
wildlife	crime	in	the	UK,	a	low	chance	of	exposure	to	grouse	moors	and	a	moderate	likelihood	of	conflict	with	rural	
stakeholders.		
Consequence	
Assessment	
	The	death	of	even	a	small	number	of	Lynx	from	the	founder	population	could	have	severe	biological	and	economic	
impacts	on	the	viability	of	the	Trial.	The	loss	of	key	breeding	individuals	could	reduce	reproductive	potential	and	
recruitment.	Furthermore,	due	to	the	indiscriminate	nature	of	poison	baits	the	risk	of	morbidity	and	mortality	would	
extend	to	other	resident	species	of	wild	carnivores/omnivores	such	as	badgers	(Meles	meles)	and	to	domestic	pets	
such	as	dogs	walked	in	the	Kielder	forest.	Economic	impact	would	derive	from	the	need	for	additional	surveillance	
of	 the	 remaining	 Lynx	 and	 the	 requirement	 for	 comprehensive	 post	 mortem	 examination	 including	 toxicology	
screening.		
	
The	severe	consequences	of	illegal	persecution	are	moderated	by	the	following	factors;	firstly,	the	introduction	of	
robust	legislation	to	control	the	illegal	use	of	firearms,	poisons	and	traps;	secondly	the	implementation	of	legislation	
and	surveillance	by	the	National	Wildlife	Crime	Unit	(NWCU)	and	finally	a	moderate	chance	of	exposure.	Overall	the	
likelihood	of	consequences	is	moderate.	
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Overall	Risk	Estimation	 Moderate	
Risk	Management	 To	 mitigate	 the	 threats	 of	 illegal	 persecution	 the	 Trust	 has	 conducted	 an	 exhaustive	 community	 engagement	
programme	within	the	destination	environment	including	public	meetings,	farm	visits	and	door	to	door	work.	The	
aim	of	the	local	consultation	(“PALC”)	is	to	inform	the	public,	address	their	concerns	and	invite	them	to	contribute	
to	the	work	of	the	trust.	A	compensation	scheme	will	operate	to	mitigate	any	financial	losses	resulting	from	Lynx	
preying	on	sheep.	
	
Satellite	collars	will	enable	the	Team	to	identify	the	location	of	each	Lynx	in	real	time,	to	provide	an	early	warning	
system	if	individual	Lynx	are	straying	beyond	the	forest	boundary	into	grazed	pasture	and	moorland.	In	the	unlikely	
event	 of	 a	 ‘rogue’	 Lynx	 targeting	 livestock,	 the	 individual	 will	 be	 recaptured	 and	 maintained	 in	 captivity	 or	
translocated	to	suitable	habitat	out-with	the	area	of	capture.				
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							of	the	Eurasian	lynx	(Lynx	lynx)	in	2001.	KORA	Bericht	no.	19,	Muri.	
2. Ryser-Degiorgis,	M.P.	(2009)	Causes	of	mortality	and	diseases	of	Eurasian	lynx	(Lynx	lynx).	Iberian	lynx	ex-situ	conservation:	An	interdisciplinary	approach,	pp.274-
289.	
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B)	Generic	Stress	 Hazard	Categories	(Source/Destination/Population/Transport)	
Justification	for	
Hazard	Status	
Stress	can	impact	on	the	health	and	welfare	of	wild	felines	at	all	stages	of	the	translocation	pathway	including	
capture,	transport,	soft	release	and	post-release	monitoring.	Acute	stress,	activated	by	adverse	or	threatening	
stimuli,	is	an	adaptive	survival	mechanism	characterized	by	the	rapid	fight	or	flight	response	and	is	mediated	by	the	
sympathetic	nervous	system	and	glucocorticoid	release	following	stimulation	of	the	hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal	
axis	(HPA).	An	acute	stress	response	during	translocation	could	result	in	a	heightened	state	of	arousal,	attempts	to	
escape	and	associated	trauma	such	as	nail	injuries	and	long	bone	fractures.	
	
Chronic	stress	occurs	when	the	state	of	acute	stress	persists	for	prolonged	periods	and	constitutes	a	common	
maladaptive	response	encountered	during	reintroduction	programmes.	Prolonged	release	of	corticosteroids	can	
result	in	suppression	of	the	immune	system,	reproductive	dysfunction,	weight	loss	due	to	reduced	feeding	behaviour	
and	increased	parasite	loads.	Terio	et	al.	(2004)	conducted	a	comparative	study	to	quantify	fecal	corticoid	levels	and	
adrenal	hypertrophy	as	indicators	of	chronic	stress	in	populations	of	captive	and	free	ranging	cheetah	(Acinonyx	
jubatus).	Captive	individuals	demonstrated	significantly	higher	base-line	fecal	corticoid	levels	and	larger	adrenal	
cortices	than	free	ranging	cheetahs.	The	authors	concluded	that	this	chronic	stress	response	was	likely	to	contribute	
to	the	higher	incidence	of	disease	and	reproductive	dysfunction	in	captive	populations.		
	
Despite	low	levels	of	stress-induced	pathologies	in	captive	Lynx,	comparative	studies	of	captive	and	wild	free	ranging	
Canada	lynx	(Lynx	canadensis)	populations	have	also	documented	significantly	higher	fecal	corticosteroid	
metabolites	(FGM)	in	captive	individuals	(2).	Chronic	stress	in	captive	Canada	lynx	could	have	sub-clinical	impacts	and	
account	for	the	poor	reproductive	output	documented	in	zoological	collections.	Fanson	et	al.	(2013)	evaluated	a	
variety	of	housing	and	husbandry	factors	on	adrenocortical	activity	in	captive	Canada	lynx	populations.	The	study	
revealed	significant	increases	in	adrenocortical	activity	associated	with	the	following	factors:	reductions	in	the	size	of	
the	enclosure,	reductions	in	the	number	of	hiding	places,	the	social	structure	of	lynx	and	movement	to	a	new	
enclosure	or	zoological	collection.	Mixed	sex	groups	demonstrated	higher	FGM	levels	than	same	sex	groups	and	lynx	
housed	alone	had	the	lowest	levels	of	FGM	(3).		
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Risk	Assessment	
Exposure	Assessment	 Founder	Lynx	could	experience	stress	at	all	stages	of	the	translocation	pathway	including	the	administration	of	
anaesthetics	for	procedures	such	as	the	application	of	satellite	collars	and	routine	health	monitoring.		
Episodes	of	acute	stress	are	likely	to	be	associated	with	capture,	transport	and	anaesthesia.	Exposure	to	chronic	
stress	could	occur	in	the	soft	release	enclosures	(“Release	Pens”)	at	the	release	environment	and	in	the	post-release	
period.		
Consequence	
Assessment	
Acute	stress	could	result	in	traumatic	injuries	to	limbs,	nails,	gums	and	teeth	and	could	contribute	to	anaesthetic	
induced	morbidity	and	mortality.	Chronic	stress	in	the	Release	Pens	could	suppress	immune	function	and	increase	
susceptibility	to	disease	with	concomitant	negative	impacts	on	reproduction,	hunting	success	and	survival	in	the	
post-release	environment.		
Overall	Risk	
Estimation	
Moderate	
Risk	Management	 All	personnel	with	direct	involvement	in	the	translocation	process,	will	adopt	a	quiet	and	calm	manner	around	the	
founder	Lynx.	Each	stage	of	the	translocation	will	be	meticulously	planned	to	minimize	human	contact,	avoid	
habituation	and	reduce	the	likelihood	of	human-Lynx	conflict	post-release.		
	
To	minimize	acute	capture	related	stress	and	trauma,	only	box	traps	with	wooden	panels	instead	of	steel	mesh	will	
be	used.	All	traps	will	be	fitted	with	electronic	radio-alarms	or	sms	alarms	to	determine	the	time	of	capture	and	
enable	a	quick	response	from	the	scientific	and	veterinary	teams	(4).	To	mitigate	transport	related	stress,	the	design	
of	the	IATA	standard	transport	crates	should	be	carefully	considered	and	particular	care	should	be	taken	when	
loading	and	unloading	the	Lynx.	Non-sedative	anxiolytic	drugs	will	be	used	to	avoid	self-trauma	in	individuals	that	
display	severe	stress	behaviour	during	transport.	The	ambient	temperature	during	transport	will	be	monitored	and	
adjusted	to	keep	the	Lynx	cool	and	avoid	thermal	stress.	
	
To	avoid	chronic	stress	at	the	destination	environment,	the	scientific	team	will	incorporate	recommendations	from	
Fanson	et	al.	(2013)	and	others	into	the	design	and	management	of	the	soft-release	enclosures.	Adult	Lynx	will	be	
housed	individually	to	reflect	the	solitary	nature	of	autochthonous	populations.	Enclosures	will	be	large	and	spatially	
heterogenous	to	provide	environmental	enrichment	and	places	where	the	Lynx	can	hide.		
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The	trust	will	use	best	practice	methods	drawn	from	the	Norwegian	School	of	Veterinary	Science	(5)	and	the	
International	Zoo	Veterinary	Group	(IZVG)	regarding	anaesthetic	procedures	and	protocols	for	Lynx.		
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and	function.	Journal	of	Wildlife	Diseases,	40(2),	pp.259-266.	
2. Fanson,	K.V.,	Wielebnowski,	N.C.,	Shenk,	T.M.	and	Lucas,	J.R.,	2012.	Comparative	patterns	of	adrenal	activity	in	captive	and	wild	Canada	lynx	(Lynx	canadensis).	
Journal	of	Comparative	Physiology	B,	182(1),	pp.157-165.	
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Appendix	3.		
Necropsy	Protocol	for	Lynx	(Lynx	lynx)	
	
Lynx	carcases	for	necropsy	will	be	promptly	relocated	to:	
Dept	of	Veterinary	Pathology	and	Public	Health	
The	Institute	of	Veterinary	Science	
University	of	Liverpool	
Leahurst	Campus,	Neston,		CH64	7TE		
	
If	this	is	not	possible	either	freezing	the	entire	carcase	or	an	in	situ	necropsy	may	to	take	
place.		
If	an	in	situ	necropsy	occurs,	then	please	send	the	below	completed	reports	(including	
digital	images),	by	email	if	possible,	to:		
	
Dr	Julian	Chantrey				
Veterinary	Adviser	to	the	Lynx	UK	Trust		
University	of	Liverpool		
Email:	chantrey@liv.ac.uk			
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Necropsy	Protocol	for	Lynx	(Lynx	lynx)	
	
	
Necropsy	performed	by:	__________________________________________________________		
	
Agency/organisation:							______________________________________________________		
	
Email:		 _________________		 	 	 Phone	number:	_____________		
	
Address:		
__________________________________________________________		
	
__________________________________________________________		
	
__________________________________________________________		
	 	
ANIMAL	DETAILS:		
Captive	or	free-ranging:	_____________________________________________________		
	
Identity/name:	________________		
	
Transponder:	________________		
	
Sex:	______________		 	 	 	 Weight:	_______________		
	
Date	of	birth	(if	known)	:	______________		 Age:	_______________		
	
Where	found	(including	GPS	location	if	possible):___________________________________		
	
Environmental	conditions:______________________________________________________		
	
Date	of	death:	__________________		
	
Date	of	necropsy:	______________		
	
Proven	breeder:	______________________________________________________________		
	
	
History	(include	clinical	signs	and	circumstances	of	death):		
	
_____________________________________________________________________		
	
_____________________________________________________________________				
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GROSS	NECROPSY	FINDINGS:		
Fill	in	details	of	gross	necropsy	findings	in	sections	below,	or	circle	one	of	NAD	(no	abnormality	
detected)	or	NE	(not	examined).		
	
It	is	extremely	valuable	if	you	can	take	digital	images	of	any	abnormalities	found		
	
General	condition:	(nutritional	condition,	physical	condition,	carcass	fresh	or	decomposed	etc).		
NAD/NE		
	
Skin:	(NB	in	the	case	of	a	neonate,	examine	the	umbilical	stump	and	surrounding	tissues)		
NAD/NE		
	
Musculoskeletal	system:	(bones,	joints,	muscles)		
NAD/NE		
	
Body	cavities:	(fat	stores,	abnormal	fluids)		
NAD/NE		
	
Lymphoreticular	system:	(spleen,	lymph	nodes,	lymphatics,	thymus)		
NAD/NE		
	
Respiratory	system:	(nasal	cavity,	larynx,	trachea,	lungs,	regional	LN's.	In	neonates	note	whether	
lungs	float	or	sink	in	formol	saline)		
	
Digestive	system:	(mouth,	teeth,	oesophagus,	stomach,	intestines,	liver,	pancreas,	mesenteric	
lymph	nodes.	In	the	case	of	a	neonate,	note	whether	milk	is	present	in	the	stomach)		
NAD/NE		
	
Cardiovascular	system:	(heart,	pericardium,	blood	vessels)		
NAD/NE		
	
Urinary	system:	(kidneys,	ureters,	urinary	bladder,	urethra)		
NAD/NE		
	
Reproductive	system:	(testes/ovaries,	uterus,	vagina,	penis,	prepuce,	accessory	glands,	mammary	
glands,	placenta)		
NAD/NE		
	
Endocrine	system:	(adrenals,	thyroid,	parathyroids,	pituitary)		
NAD/NE		
	
Nervous	system:	(brain,	spinal	cord,	peripheral	nerves)		
NAD/NE		
	
Sensory	organs:	(ears,	eyes)		
NAD/NE		
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LABORATORY	TESTS	&	DIAGNOSES:		
	
Laboratory	Tests:		
Give	details	of	all	specimens	submitted	for	bacteriology,	virology,	parasitology,	histopathology.		
	
Please	attach	reports	of	these	tests	to	the	completed	form.		
	
Bacteriology:	Report	attached:	Y/N		
	
Virology:	Report	attached:	Y/N		
	
Parasitology:	Report	attached:	Y/N		
	
Histopathology:	Report	attached:	Y/N		
	
Other:	(specify)	Report	attached:	Y/N		
	
Preliminary	diagnosis:		
FINAL	DIAGNOSIS:		
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TISSUES	FOR	STORAGE		
In	addition	to	specimens	submitted	for	diagnostic	pathology,	the	following	tissues	should	be	
preserved	in	10%	buffered	formal	saline	at	a	ratio	of	1	part	tissue	to	10	parts	formal	saline.	Sections	
should	be	no	thicker	than	1	cm.	Examples	of	all	lesions	should	also	be	included.	Tissues	should	be	
accurately	labelled	and	stored.		
	
Tissue	Area	Taken	(y/n)		
	
Adrenal	Entire	gland	with	transverse	cut	______		
	
Brain	Sliced	longitudinally	along	midline	______		
	
Heart	Entire	heart	after	opening	&	examining	atria,	______		
ventricles	and	valves	from	each	side		
	
Intestines	3cm	lengths	of	duodenum,	jejunum,	ileum,	______		
caecum	&	colon	Open	along	long	axis		
	
Kidney	Section	of	cortex,	medulla	&	pelvis	from	each	______		
	
Liver	2	sections	from	2	lobes	with	capsule	and	______		
gall	bladder		
	
Lung	Sections	from	several	lobes	including	a	______		
bronchus		
	
Lymph	nodes	Cervical,	anterior	mediastinal,	bronchial,	______		
mesenteric	and	lumbar	with	a	transverse	cut		
	
Pancreas	Samples	from	2	areas	______		
	
Peripheral	nerve	3cm	section	of	sciatic	nerve	______	
		
Skeletal	muscle	Cross-section	of	thigh	muscles	______		
	
Skin	3cm	length	of	full	thickness	abdominal	skin	_____		
	
Spleen	Cross	section	including	capsule	______		
	
Spinal	cord	Sections	from	cervical,	thoracic	&	lumbar	cord	______		
	
Stomach	Cardia,	antrum	and	pylorus	______		
	
Testis/ovary	Entire	with	transverse	cut	______		
	
Thyroid	Intact	including	parathyroids	______		
	
Urinary	bladder	Cross-section	______		
	
Uterus	Entire	with	longitudinal	cut	into	lumen	______	
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Appendix	4.		
	
Hazard	Identification	Spreadsheet	(see	supporting	excel	spreadsheet)	
		
	
	
	
